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Abstract 
In this chapter we examine the relationship between Human Resource Management (HRM) 
and productivity. HRM includes incentive pay (individual and group) as well as many non-
pay aspects of the employment relationship such as matching (hiring and firing) and work 
organization (e.g. teams, autonomy). We place HRM more generally within the literature on 
management practices and productivity. We start with some facts on levels and trends of both 
HRM and productivity and the main economic theories of HRM. We look at some of the 
determinants of HRM – risk, competition, ownership and regulation. The largest section 
analyses the impact of HRM on productivity emphasizing issues of methodology, data and 
results (from micro-econometric studies). We conclude briefly with suggestions of avenues 
for future frontier work. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, labor economics focused on the labor market rather than looking inside the “black box” 
of firms. Industrial sociologists and psychologists made the running in Human Resource Management 
(HRM). This has changed dramatically in last two decades. Human Resource Management (HRM) is 
now a major field in labor economics. The hallmark of this work is to use standard economic tools 
applied to the special circumstances of managing employees within companies. HRM economics has a 
major effect on the world through teaching in business schools, and ultimately what gets practiced in 
many organizations. 
 
HRM covers a wide range of activities. The main area of study we will focus on will be incentives and 
work organization. Incentives include remuneration systems (e.g. individuals or group 
incentive/contingent pay) and also the system of appraisal, promotion and career advancement. By 
work organization we mean the distribution of decision rights (autonomy/decentralization) between 
managers and workers, job design (e.g. flexibility of working, job rotation), team-working (e.g. who 
works with whom) and information provision.  
 
Space limitations mean we do not cover matching (see Oyer and Schaffer, this Volume) or skill 
development/training. Second, we will only devote a small amount of space to employee 
representation such as labor unions (see Farber, this Volume). Third, we should also mention that we 
focus on empirical work rather than theory (for recent surveys see Gibbons and Roberts, 2008, and in 
particular Lazear and Oyer, 2008) and micro-econometric work rather than macro or qualitative 
studies. Fourth, we focus on HRM over employees rather than CEOs, which is the subject of a vast 
literature (see Murphy, 1999, or Edmans, Gabaix and Landier, 2008, for surveys).  
 
Where we depart from several of the existing surveys in the field is to put HRM more broadly in the 
context of the economics of management. To do this we also look in detail at the literature on 
productivity dispersion.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we detail some facts about HRM and 
productivity both in the cross sectional and time series dimension. In Section 3 we look at the impact 
of HRM on productivity with an emphasis on methodologies and the mechanisms. In Section 4 we 
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discuss some theoretical perspectives, contrasting the usual “Design” approach to our concept of HRM 
as one example of “management as a technology”. In Section 5 we discuss some of the factors 
determining HRM, focusing on risk, competition, ownership, trade and regulation. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Some facts on HRM and productivity 
 
2.1. HRM practices 
 
In the 1970s the general assumption was that incentive pay would continue to decline in importance. 
This opinion was based on the fact that traditional unskilled jobs with piece-rate incentives were 
declining, and white collar jobs with stable salaries and promotion based incentives were increasing. 
Surprisingly, however, it appears (at least in the US) that over the last three decades a greater 
proportion of jobs have become rewarded with contingent pay, and this is in fact particularly true for 
salaried workers. 
 
There are two broad methods of assessing the importance of incentive pay: Direct and Indirect 
methods. Direct methods use data on the incidence of HRM, often drawn from specialist surveys. 
Indirect methods use various forms of statistical inference, ideally from matched worker-firm data, to 
assess the extent to which pay is contingent on performance. We deal mainly with the direct evidence 
and then discuss more briefly the indirect evidence. 
 
2.1.1. HRM measured using direct methods 
 
Incentive Pay  
Individual incentive pay information is available from a variety of sources. Using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamic (PSID) Lemieux, McCleod and Parent (2009) estimate that about 14% of US prime 
age men in 1998 received performance pay (see Figure 2.1). They define a worker as receiving 
performance pay if any part of compensation includes bonus, commission or piece rate1 (data on stock 
options and shares is not included). They find a much higher incidence of performance pay jobs (37% 
on average between 1976-1998) defined as a job where a worker ever received some kind of 
                                                 
1 Overtime is removed, but the question is imperfect pre-1993 which could lead to undercounting performance pay. 
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performance pay2. They also look at the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) which shows 
coverage of performance pay jobs for men of 26% in 1988 to 1990.  
 
Other papers deliver similar estimates of around 40% to 50% of US employees being covered by some 
form of performance pay. For example, using the US General Social Survey Kruse, Blasi and Park 
(2009) estimate that 47% of American workers were covered by some group incentive scheme in 2006. 
Of this 38% of employees were covered by profit sharing, 27% by gain-sharing, 18% by stock 
ownership (9% by stock options) and 4.6% by all three types. Lawler et al (2003) surveyed Fortune 
1,000 corporations between 1987 and 2002 asking detailed questions on their HRM3. Using midpoints 
of their results (which are in bands) Lemieux et al (2008) calculate that 44% of workers were covered 
by incentive pay in 2002. 
 
It is also interesting to look at the trends in incentive pay over time. In US data, Lemieux, McCleod 
and Parent (2009) find that for the wider definition of performance pay (if the worker was eligible for 
any performance related pay) the incidence rises from 38% in the 1970s to 45% in the 1990s (see 
Figure 2.1). Interestingly, this rise in performance pay was mostly driven by increases in performance 
pay for salaried workers, for whom this rose from 45% in the 1970s to 60% in the 1990s. In contrast 
hourly paid workers have both lower levels and growth rates in performance pay.  Lawler et al. (2003) 
show similar rises in performance pay, increasing from 21% (1987) to 27% (1990) to 35% (1996) to 
45% (2002). Lazear and Shaw (2008) also show some breakdown trends reproduced in Table 2.1, 
showing again performance pay has clearly increased over time in the US. 
 
In the UK the British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) contains a cross section of 
all establishments with 25 or more employees in the UK (over 2,000 in each year). There are 
consistent questions in 1984, 1990 and 2004 on whether the firm used any form of performance/ 
contingent pay for workers both individually and collectively (e.g. team bonuses, Profit-related pay or 
Employee Share Ownership Schemes). Figure 2.2 shows that 41% of UK establishments had 
contingent pay in 1984, and this rose to 55% twenty years later. Two other points are noteworthy. 
First, this time series change is driven by the private sector: not only was the incidence of incentive 
pay very low in the public sector 10% or less, it actually fell over time (Lemieux et al 2009 exclude the 
                                                 
2 The difference is somewhat surprising as it suggests that performance pay jobs only pay out infrequently, which doesn‟t 
comply with casual observation (e.g. piece rates will almost always pay something). 
3 The problem with the Lawler surveys is that the sampling frame is only larger companies compared to the more 
representative individual level PSID. Furthermore, the response rate to the survey has declined rapidly from over 50% in 
1987 to only 15% by 1999. This poses a serious concern that the time series trends are not representative even of larger 
firms. 
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public sector in their US analysis). Second, the growth of incentive pay in the UK is primarily in the 
1980s with no growth in the 1990s, similar to the US results shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
So in summary, the evidence is that overall performance pay related covers about 40% to 50% of US 
workers by the 2000s, and pay has been increasing over the last three decades, particularly over the 
1970s and 1980s. A number of reasons suggested for the increase in performance related pay which we 
will examine in detail in section 5 below. 
 
Other HRM Practices  
Turning to more general forms of HRM than pay, like self-managed teams, performance feedback, job 
rotation, regular meetings, and training it becomes rather harder to summarize the existing information. 
In the cross section there are a number of surveys with different sampling bases, response rates and 
questions making them hard to compare. Perhaps the most representative example for the US is Black 
and Lynch (2001, 2004) who helped collected information from a survey backed by the US 
Department of Labor (used also by Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). In 1996, for example, about 17% of 
US establishments had self-managed teams, 49% in formal meetings and 25% in job rotation. Lawler 
et al. (2003)‟s data of larger firms unsurprisingly shows a greater incidence of “innovative” HRM 
practices. In their data for 1996, 78% of firms had self-managed teams and this covered at least 20% of 
the workforce for just under a third of all corporations.   
 
Bryson and Wood (2009) present an analysis of “high involvement” HRM using the UK WERS data 
(see Table 2.2). About half of all UK establishments had “team-working” in 1998. More interestingly, 
the WERS data allows an analysis of changes over time. The incidence of  teamwork (as indicated by 
“team briefings” has grown from 31% in 1984 to 70% in 2004 and “suggestion schemes” has grown 
from 22% in 1984 to 36% 20 years later. Disclosure of Information regarding investment plans has 
risen from 32% to 46% over the same period. Most other forms of innovative HRM look remarkably 
stable, however, with the exception of incentive pay that has already been discussed. 
 
Wider International Comparisons 
To compare a wider basket of countries beyond the UK and US the best source of information is 
probably the Bloom-Van Reenen (2007) surveys on general management practices. These have some 
specific questions on HRM or “people management”, which have been collected from 17 countries. 
Since we will refer to this work at several points we describe the methodology in a little detail as it is 
somewhat different than the standard HRM surveys described above. The essential method was to start 
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with a grid of “best practices” in HR and non-HR management and then score firms along each of the 
eighteen dimensions of this grid following an in-depth telephone interview with the plant manager. 
These eighteen dimensions covered three broad areas: monitoring, target setting and people 
management (see Appendix Table A1 for details). The people section covers a range of HR practices 
including whether companies are promoting and rewarding employees based on worker ability and 
effort; whether firms have systems to hire and retain their most productive employees; and whether 
they deal with underperformers through retraining and effective sanctions. For example, we examine 
whether employees that perform well, work hard and display high ability are promoted faster than 
others. 
 
To obtain accurate responses from firms the survey targetted production plant managers using a 
„double-blind‟ technique. One part of this double-blind technique is that managers are not told they are 
being scored or shown the scoring grid. They are only told they are being “interviewed about 
management practices for a research project”. To run this blind scoring we used “open” questions 
since these do not tend to lead respondents to a particular answer. For example, the first people 
management question starts by asking respondents “tell me how does your promotion system work” 
rather than a closed question such as “do you promote on ability (yes/no)”. Interviewers also probed 
for examples to support assertions, for example asking “tell me about your most recent promotion 
round”. The other side of the double-blind technique is interviewers are not told in advance anything 
about the firm‟s performance to avoid prejuduice. They are only provided with the company name, 
telephone number and industry. Since the survey covers medium-sized firms (defined as those 
employing between 100 and 10,000 workers) these would not be usually known ex ante by the 
interviewers.  
 
These management practices were strongly correlated with firm‟s performance data from their 
company accounts (total factor productivity, profitability, growth rates, and Tobin‟s Q and survival 
rates). These correlations are not causal but do suggest that HR practices that reward effort and 
performance are associated with better firm performance. Other research shows that these practices are 
also associated with better patient outcomes in hospitals (Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen, 
2009) and improved work-life balance indicators (Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of these people management practices across countries. The US 
clearly has the highest average scores for people management. Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van 
Reenen (2009) show that this appears to be due to a combination of the US being absolutely good at 
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managing firms across all 18 questions on average, and also having a particular advantage in people 
(HR) management. Other countries with light labor regulation like Canada, Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland also display relatively strong HR management practices. Interestingly Germany and Japan also 
fare well, in large part reflecting the fact that these countries have generally well managed 
manufacturing firms.  
 
Figure 2.4 breaks out the people management score into three of the key areas in the overall people 
management score, which are promotions, fixing/firing underperformers and rewards. What is clear is 
that US firms have the globally highest scored practices across all three dimensions, but are 
particularly strong on “fixing/firing” practices. That is, in the US employees who underperform are 
most likely to be rapidly “fixed” (dealt with through re-training or rotated to another part of the firm 
where they can succeed), or if this fails “fired” (moved out of the firm). In contrast in countries like 
Greece and Brazil underperforming employees are typically left in post for several months or even 
years before any action is taken to address them. In sub-section 4.1 we discuss reasons for these 
patterns. Broadly speaking, the high levels of competition and low incidence of family firms are the 
main contributing factors to the leading position of the US in overall management. On top of this, high 
levels of education and weaker labor regulations give American firms a particular advantage in the HR 
aspect of management. 
 
Figure 2.5 displays the firm level distributions within each country for these management practices, 
showing there is a wide dispersion of practices within every country. The US average score is the 
highest because it has almost no firms with weak HR management practices, while Brazil and Greece 
has a large tail of firms with poor HR management practices. This wide variation within each country 
is what most of the prior micro literature has focused on, with Figure 2.5 showing this variation is 
common across every country we have investigated. 
 
2.1.2. Measuring Incentive Pay through indirect methods 
 
The indirect method has been common in labor economics mainly due to data constraints. Essentially 
this method examines the correlation of workers‟ remuneration with firm-specific characteristics that 
should be important if pay is contingent on performance such as profitability, market value, etc. For 
example, if there are profit-related pay schemes, increases in firm profits should cause increases in 
worker pay. If pay was set solely on the external labor market, it should be unrelated to idiosyncratic 
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changes in the firm‟s financial position. An advantage of this approach over the direct approach is that 
many of the incentive schemes may not be explicitly written down as contracts. A disadvantage is that 
the correlations between firm performance and pay we observe may be unrelated to incentive schemes 
for econometric reasons - e.g. a positive demand shock may simultaneously raise a firm‟s profitability 
and mean it hires workers of an unobservably higher skill level. Further, to the extent we do credibly 
identify a causal effect of firm performance on worker pay we cannot discern easily whether this is due 
to explicit contracts, implicit contracts, union bargaining4 or some other model. 
 
Having said this, there is substantial evidence that firm performance does matter a lot for worker 
remuneration. This is clearest in the many studies of matched worker firm data which generally shows 
an important role for firm characteristics in determining worker wages (e.g. Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis, 1999). Simple OLS regressions of changes of wages on changes of firm's profitability tend 
to find a positive effect (e.g. Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfrey (1996), but these are likely to be 
downward biased as shocks to wages will tend to reduce profitability. Using trade-based (Abowd and 
Lemieux, 1993) or technology-based (Van Reenen, 1996) instrumental variables tends to significantly 
increase the effect of firm performance on wages as we would expect. Matched worker-firm data is 
now commonly available in a large number of countries (see the collection of papers in Lazear and 
Shaw, 2008, for example). In the US, for example, Abowd, Haltiwanger and Lane (2008) use the 
LEHD (Longitudinal Employer- Household Dynamics Program) covering about 80% of all employees. 
They show that about one half of all individual wage variance is associated with individual 
characteristics and about a half due to firm effects. 
 
Although the focus of the literature has mainly been on explaining the distribution of wages at a point 
in time Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and Troske (2004) show that between firm effects are important in 
understanding the growing inequality of wages over time in the US. Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen 
(2007) also find this for the UK and furthermore, offer evidence that the association of firm 
performance with wages has grown stronger over time. This is consistent with the more direct 
evidence discussed above that performance pay (explicit or implicit) may be more prevalent in recent 
years. 
  
2.2. Productivity dispersion 
 
                                                 
4 Abowd (1989) looks at unexpected changes to wages and finds that shareholders wealth falls by an equal and opposite 
amount. He interprets this as consistent with strongly efficient bargaining over the rents between unions and firms.  
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Research on firm heterogeneity has a long history in social science. Systematic empirical analysis first 
focused on the firm size distribution measured by employment, sales or assets. Most famously, Gibrat 
(1931), characterized the size distribution as approximately log normal and sought to explain this with 
reference to simple statistical models of growth (i.e. Gibrat‟s Law that firm growth is independent of 
size). In the 1970s as data became available by firm and line of business, attention focused on 
profitability as an indicator of performance (e.g. Kwoka and Ravenscraft, 1986). Accounting 
profitability can differ substantially from economic profitability, however, and may rise due to market 
power rather than efficiency.  
 
In recent decades the development of larger databases has enabled researchers to look more directly at 
productivity. The growing availability of plant-level data from the Census Bureau in the US and other 
nations combined with rapid increases in computer power has facilitated this development. 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008) offer many examples of the cross country micro-
datasets now being used for productivity analysis.   
 
One of the robust facts emerging from these analyses is the very high degree of heterogeneity between 
business units (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). For example, Syverson (2004a) analyzes labor 
productivity (output per worker) in US manufacturing establishments in the 1997 Economic Census 
and shows that on average, a plant at the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution is over four 
times as productive as a plant at the 10th percentile in the same four digit sector. Similarly, Criscuolo, 
Haskel and Martin (2003) show that in the UK in 2000 there is a fivefold difference in productivity 
between these deciles. 
  
What could explain these differences in productivity, and how can they persist in a competitive 
industry? One explanation is that if we accounted properly for the different inputs in the production 
function there would be little residual productivity differences5. It is certainly true that moving from 
labor productivity to total factor productivity (TFP) reduces the scale of the difference. For example, in 
Syverson (2004) the 90-10 productivity difference falls from a factor of 4 to a factor of 1.9, but it does 
not disappear.  
 
                                                 
5 This is analogous to the historical debate in the macro time series of productivity between Solow, who claimed that TFP 
was a large component of aggregate growth and Jorgenson who claimed that there was little role for TFP when all inputs 
were properly measured (see Griliches, 1996). A similar debate is active in “levels accounting” of cross-country TFP (e.g. 
Caselli, 2005). 
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These differences show up clearly even for quite homogeneous goods. An early example is Salter 
(1960) who studied the British pig iron industry between 1911 and 1926. He showed that the best 
practice factory produced nearly twice as many tons per hour as the average factory. More recently, 
Syverson (2004b) shows TFP (and size) is very dispersed in the US ready mix concrete industry. 
Interestingly, the mean level of productivity was higher in more competitive markets (as indicated by a 
measure of spatial demand density) and this seemed to be mainly due to a lower mass in the left tail in 
the more competitive sector. Studies of large changes in product market competition such as trade 
liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002), foreign entry into domestic markets (Schmitz, 2005) or 
deregulation (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996) suggest that the subsequent increase in aggregate 
productivity has a substantial reallocation element6. 
 
A major problem in measuring productivity is the fact that researchers rarely observe plant level prices 
so an industry price deflator is usually used. Consequently, measured TFP typically includes an 
element of the firm-specific price-cost margin (e.g. Klette and Griliches, 1994). Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Syverson (2009) study 11 seven-digit homogeneous goods (including block ice, white pan bread, 
cardboard boxes and carbon black) where they have access to plant specific output (and input) prices. 
They find that conventionally measured revenue based TFP (“TFPR”) numbers actually understate the 
degree of true productivity dispersion (“TFPQ”) especially for newer firms as the more productive 
firms typically have lower prices and are relatively larger7.  
 
Higher TFP is positively related to firm size, growth and survival probabilities. Bartelsman and 
Dhrymes (1998, Table A.7) show that over a five year period around one third of plants stay in their 
productivity quintile. This suggests that productivity differences are not purely transitory, but partially 
persist.  
 
Analysis of changes in aggregate productivity over time has shown that this productivity dispersion is 
also important in explaining economic growth. For example, Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) find 
that half of the change in US industry-level productivity is due to the reallocation of output from lower 
productivity plants to those with higher productivity. This reallocation effect is partly due to the shift 
                                                 
6 There is also a significant effect of such policy changes on the productivity of incumbent firms. Modelling the changing 
incentives to invest in productivity enhancing activities, such as R&D, is more difficult in heterogeneous firm models, but 
some recent progress has been made (e.g. Aw, Roberts and Xu, 2008). 
7 Foster et al (2009) show that measured revenue TFP will in general be correlated with true TFP but also with the firm 
specific price shocks. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) detail a model where heterogeneous TFPQ produces no difference in TFPR 
because the more productive firms grow larger and have lower prices, thus equalizing TFPR. In their model intra-industry 
variation in TFPR is due to distortions as firms face different input prices. 
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in market share between incumbents and partly due to the effects of exit and entry. Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008) show that the speed of reallocation is much stronger in some 
countries (like the US) than others. There is also significant sectoral variation. For example, Foster, 
Krizan and Haltiwanger, 2006, show that reallocation between stores accounts for almost all aggregate 
productivity growth in the US retail sector. 
 
In summary, there is a substantial body if evidence of persistent firm-level heterogeneity in firm 
productivity (and other dimensions of performance) in narrow industries in many countries and time 
periods. Differential observable inputs, heterogeneous prices and idiosyncratic stochastic shocks are 
not able to adequately account for the remarkable dispersion of productivity. So what could account 
for this? One long suggested factor is management practices, with authors going back at least to 
Walker (1887) suggesting that management practices play an essential role in explaining differences in 
performance across firms. 8 
 
 
3. The effects of HRM on productivity 
 
So the question is do variations in variations in HRM practices play a role in driving differences in and 
productivity?  We find that the answer is “probably, yes”, although the empirical basis for this which 
we survey in detail is surprisingly weak given the importance of the topic. In fact, as Syversson (2010) 
notes in discussing management as a driver of productivity “no potential driving factor of productivity 
has seen a higher ratio of speculation to empirical study”.  
 
We should also state in advance that in this section we focus on productivity as the key outcome. 
Many studies look at other outcomes such as worker turnover, absenteeism, worker perceptions, etc. 
These are useful, but if they have no effect on productivity then in our view they are second order – 
generally studies use them because they have no direct evidence on productivity (e.g. Blasi et al, 
2009:4). We do not focus on measures of worker wellbeing such as job satisfaction or wages. Lazear 
and Shaw (2008) suggest that some of the dramatic increase in wage inequality in the US, UK and 
other country since the late 1970s is due to HRM practices. Lemieux et al (2009) and Guadalupe and 
Cunat (2009a) also take this position, although the current state of the evidence is still limited. These 
                                                 
8 Walker was an important character in the early years of the economics discipline as the founding president of the 
American Economics Association, the second president of MIT, and the Director of the 1870 Economic Census. 
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are interesting outcomes in their own right, and may also feed through into productivity, but we are 
space constrained and refer the reader to the wider literature were relevant. 
 
An important issue is the correct way to econometrically estimate production functions and TFP. 
Ackerberg et al (2007) have surveyed such methods in a recent Handbook chapter, and this is a lively 
(but still unsettled) area of research. Many of the issues on econometric identification of the 
parameters of conventional factors of production (such as labor or capital) are the same as those that 
will be discussed in sub-section 3.2 below. There is also a growing literature on examining the impact 
of worker characteristics (or “human resources” such as skills, gender, race, seniority and age) on 
productivity through direct estimation in production functions rather than the traditional approach of 
looking at these indirectly through including them in wage equations. Interested readers are referred to 
recent examples of this approach in Moretti (2004), Hellerstein et al (1999) and Dearden et al (2006).  
 
3.1 Why should we expect to see an impact of HRM on productivity? 
 
Before discussing issues of identification and the results from these studies, it is worth asking some 
basic questions: (a) why is this an interesting empirical question? and (b) why would we expect to see 
any positive average effect of HRM practices on productivity? Note that the answer to this question is 
not specific to human resources, but any endogenously chosen organizational design of the firm. 
 
One response is that we should not expect to see any effects. The design perspective on HRM 
(discussed more fully in Section 3 below) assumes that all firms are optimizing their HRM practices. 
This may vary between firms because of different environments – for example, variations in 
technologies across industries – but each firm is still optimizing. Externally manipulating the firm to 
“force” it to do something sub-optimal (e.g. adopt incentive pay schemes) can only harm the firm‟s 
performance. By contrast, using actual changes in the firm‟s choices of HRM (such as Lazear‟s (2000) 
Safelite Glass paper discussed below) will show that firms improve productivity as they will be 
optimizing so we expect any change to produce a positive outcome on average. 
 
An important rejoinder to this is that firms maximize discounted profits, not productivity. It may 
increase productivity to introduce a given HRM practice, but this may still reduce profits, which is 
why firms have chosen not to adopt. One  example is Freeman and Kleiner, 2005, who found that the 
abolition of piece rates reduced productivity but increased profits as quality rose in the absence of 
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piece rates. This is analogous to any factor input such as capital – increasing capital per hour will 
increase output per hour, but the firm already takes this into account in its maximization program. 
Thus, just as we are interested in estimating the parameters of a conventional production function for 
capital and labor, we may be interested in the parameters associated with an HRM augmented 
production function even if all management practices are chosen optimally. 
 
A second reason for studying the effect of HRM on productivity is that if we do see any effect, we are 
interested in the mechanisms through which this effect is working. For example, we expect the 
introduction of incentive pay to affect the type of workers who want to join and leave the firm. How 
important are these sorting and selections effect relatively to the pure incentive effect? Moreover, even 
if we expect a positive effect, we may not be so interested in the average effect but rather how this 
varies with observable characteristics of sub-groups of workers, or of the firm or of its environment. 
Theory suggests that changing HRM will have heterogeneous effects in this way, so this places some 
more testable restrictions on the data. 
 
Finally, we describe below theories that regard some management practices partially as a technology. 
In this case the investigation of the productivity effects of HRM is analogous to examining the effects 
of the diffusion of any “hard” technology such as computers or hybrid corn. With a new technology we 
generally expect to see slow and staggered diffusion across firms. Some of this is due to firms 
optimizing given heterogeneous costs and benefits in a full information world. But slow diffusion may 
also be due to the differential arrival rate of information about the new technology. More subtly, the 
optimal HRM type may have changed over time. For example, performance pay may now be optimal 
in many sectors where previously it was unprofitable due to rapid falls in the cost of Electronic 
Resource Planning systems (such as SAP) that measure worker output (but not effort) more accurately 
and rapidly.  If the “management as technology” perspective is correct, we would expect to see 
positive productivity effects from the adoption of these new HRM.  
 
 
3.2 HRM and productivity: the identification problem 
 
The typical study in the HRM and productivity literature in Personnel Economics examines the change 
in HR policy (typically an incentive pay reform) in a single firm and a key concern is the effect on 
worker productivity. As Shaw (2009) points out this set-up looks extremely similar to the literature on 
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policy evaluation and its concern with correctly identifying treatment effects. Of course, in standard 
policy evaluation the arena is usually larger than a single firm - a country, state or country; and the 
policy maker the government rather than the CEO. Nevertheless, all the many issues germane to 
identifying treatment effects are present and we discuss these links in this sub-section. For a longer 
discussion on different treatment effects (Local Average Treatment Effects, Marginal Treatment 
Effects, etc.) and estimation strategies (IV, control function, regression discontinuity design, matching, 
etc.) see Lee (this volume) or Blundell and Costa-Dias (2008). 
 
To be precise, let itd represent the treatment status of individual i at time t. Potential outcomes 
(productivity) are 1ity  and 
0
ity  under the treated and non-treated scenarios. These are specified as 
1
it i ity c u    for the treated and 
1
0t ity c u   for the non-treated where i  is the effect of the policy 
on individual i, c the common intercept and itu the unobservable error. We assume that the policy 
effects are heterogeneous over individuals. This allows us to write the potential outcome equation as: 
 
it i it ity c d u    
 
There are a variety of treatment effects that we may be interested in. The traditional one in the 
homogenous treatment case is the average treatment effect (ATE) defined as the average outcome if an 
individual was assigned at random to the treatment group, ( )iE  . More commonly, we can only 
identify the Average Treatment on the Treated effect (ATT) which is the average effect for the 
individuals who went through the program at some point, ( | 1)i iE d  , where id  indicates an 
individual who is assigned to treatment, even if they are not currently being treated. 
 
Consider the model where each individual i is observed before and after the policy change at times 
ot k  and 1t k  respectively. The popular Difference in Differences (DD) estimator makes the 
assumption that the error term, itu , takes a variance components form: it i t itu      , where i  is 
correlated with id , t  is a common time effect, but it  is orthogonal to the other right hand side 
variables.  
it i it i t ity c d                                                                 (1) 
 
Sequential differencing eliminates the fixed effect and the time effect so that 
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1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1( ) ( ) ( | 1)
DID
t t t t iy y y y E d ATT         
 
Where dty is the average outcome in group d at time t. Under the difference in difference assumptions 
we recover the average effect of treatment on the treated. This is equivalent to adding in time dummies 
and individual fixed effects in estimating equation (1). 
 
Most of the HR studies have longitudinal data so they are able to do the first difference 
1 0
1 1( )t ty y . 
However, many studies do not have a control group in the firm who are not treated, thus there is no 
second difference. This is a drawback because the second difference controls for unobservable time 
shocks that are common to the two groups but unobserved to the econometrician. In other words, a 
major concern is that the supposed effect of the HRM policy is actually just some other event 
simultaneously dated with the introduction of the program. 
 
In fact, many of the studies discussed below do have some more variance than just before and after for 
a single organization. First, the object of study may be a few firms in a narrowly defined industry 
(which is the usual strategy in Industrial Organization). Second, there may be variation in the 
introduction of the policy across different sub-units within the firm (e.g. different plants, different 
geographical regions9, different production lines, different teams, etc.). Exploiting this form of 
variation, however, highlights the classical assignment problem - even if the macro time shock is 
common between the two groups, the decision to adopt the policy for plant A and not to adopt it for 
plant B is unlikely to be exogenous.  
 
To see this, consider an assignment rule which is 1itd   if 
* 0itd  and 0itd  otherwise, where 
*
itd  is a 
latent index defined by the linear rule: 
* 1( 0)it it itd Z                                                                   (2) 
 
In other words, plants that introduce the HRM policy may also be those that the CEO thinks are most 
likely to benefit from it. If this could all be captured by observables then we would be able to control 
for this bias. But we are unlikely in most datasets to have such a rich set of controls. 
                                                 
9 Examining the branches of a multinational firm across different countries is an attractive strategy – e.g. Lafontaine and 
Srinivasan (2009) 
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The credibility of the identification of treatment effects from cross-plant variation will hinge on the 
assignment rule of equation (1), which is of course a selection equation. Lazear (2000), for example, 
argues that the rollout of the policy across regions within Safelite Glass was essentially unrelated to 
differential potential benefits being determined by geography. Bandiera et al (2007) examine whether 
similar productivity increases occurred at the same time in the season in a previous year when the 
policy experiment was not in place (a placebo test). 
 
Having information on productivity prior to the policy is clearly helpful in considering selection. 
Lazear (2000) and Bandiera et al (2007) can show that workers who ex ante had lower productivity 
were less likely to be selected into employment ex post. Since the selection mechanism in both papers 
means the more able workers are more likely to be employed the ATT effect will be an upper bound of 
the effect on the compliers (those who stay employed).   
 
What is the advantage of single firm studies? Single firm studies are now the dominant form of 
methodology in Personnel economics, but given the problem of the absence of an obvious control 
group, one might wonder whether this is such a good idea. Usually it is thought that focusing on a 
single firm enables researchers to control for many aspects that would be impossible to deal with in a 
larger cross-firm study. But what does this exactly mean? 
 
Consider the possibility that we have multiple firms j = 1,…, J as well as multiple workers, i = 1,…,I, 
and the difference in difference assumptions hold. Further, let us assume that there is some exogenous 
within firm variation that enable us to identify the ATT from a single firm estimation strategy. 
 
ijt ij ijt ij jt jity c d                                                            (3) 
 
If each firm j is “different” in the sense it has different time shocks ( jt ), then estimating equation (3) 
by including a common time shock t  as is typically done in the cross firm literature (e.g. Black and 
Lynch, 2004) will generally produce inconsistent estimate of the ATT effect. However, one could 
include firm*time dummies in equation (3) and recover the ATT in each firm j if the treatment
randomly varied by worker within each firm.   This would clearly be more informative than just 
recovering the ATT for one firm alone. 
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As second possible advantage of single firm strategies is that we may simply not have comparable 
policies across firms, in the sense that the policy changes ijtd are not measured in the same units. To 
some extent this is true, but there are ways in which different policies can be made comparable. In the 
work on tax policies for example, we need to calculate what effect a tax reform has on the incentives 
facing individuals. If policies are incomparable then the generalizability of such studies is severely 
limited. 
 
A third possible advantage of single firm studies is sheer institutional detail. Knowing a single firm 
well may make it possible to collect more detailed information and rule out many of the alternative 
explanations that might explain the results. 
 
All three possible advantages of confining attention to a single firm strike us as differences in degree 
rather than in kind. The future of the field may be to move away from purely single firm studies to 
consider larger numbers of firms who are subject to HRM policy interventions where we have better 
ways of measuring the relevant management policy in a comparable way. One way to do this is to 
explicitly run experiments on firms, for example Karlan and Valdiva (2009) randomize the provision 
of training for the owners of micro-enterprises in Peru, including some HRM training, and find some 
significant positive impact of sales and growth. Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2010) provide management 
training for small firms in Mexico, and again find some evidence for significant improvements on a 
range of performance metrics. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts (2010) run experiments 
on large Indian firms to introduce a modern management practices, including modern HR practices 
around piece-rate pay for workers and pay for performance for managers, and find large effects on 
productivity and profitability. While this literature is at an early stage the broad results are that 
introducing modern HRM practice into firms in developing countries leads to significant 
improvements in performance. It would clearly be helpful to have more such studies, and particularly 
in developed countries. 
 
3.3  Econometric studies of the productivity impact of HRM 
 
There are a huge number of studies here which we attempt to summarize in Table 3.1. Before 
discussing in detail, here is our four point summary. 
1. First, high quality studies generally show that there is a positive effect on productivity of 
incentive pay, both individual bonuses and (more surprisingly) group bonuses. This seems true 
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across many sectors, including the public sector (see, for example, the Prentice et al, 2007 
survey).  
2. Second, in addition to a pure incentives effect, there is usually also an important selection 
effect generating higher productivity – productivity increases because high ability workers are 
attracted to organizations offering higher powered incentives. 
3. Third, the introduction of new forms of incentive pay is generally more effective when 
combined with other “complementary” factors. There are complements within the bundles of 
HRM practices (e.g. team work and group bonuses), and between some HRM practices and 
other firm characteristics (e.g. decentralization and information technology). 
4. Fourth, there are many examples of perverse incentives, for example, when rewards are tied to 
specific periods of time so that workers manipulate commissions to hit quarterly targets. 
5. Fifth, incentive pay schemes tend to be associated with greater dispersion of productivity as the 
effects are stronger on the more able workers, and this is stronger than the selection effect 
(which pushes towards reduced dispersion) 
 
 
 
We divide this sub-section into general HRM studies, individual incentive pay, group incentive pay 
and distortions. 
 
 3.3.1 General HRM Studies  
 
There are a huge number of studies that have correlated various aspects of the firm‟s performance on 
various aspects of its HRM (recall Table 3.1 for some of the measures used). There is generally a 
strong and positive correlation between HRM and productivity.  
 
The better studies use micro data and pay careful attention to the measurement issues and need to 
control for many covariates. Black and Lynch (2001) examine various aspects of “high performance” 
workplaces including profit related pay but also Total Quality Management, benchmarking, self 
managed teams, recruitment strategies, etc. This was from a rich cross sectional survey that they 
helped design (the EQW-NES) that could be matched to plant-level panel data from the Census 
Bureau. They estimated production functions controlling for conventional inputs such as labor, capital 
and materials, but also included a large number of these HRM practices. They found relatively few 
practices were significantly related to total factor productivity - profit sharing for non-managers and 
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benchmarking were two of the stronger ones. The Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management scores 
also show high correlations of HR management scores with labor productivity, as illustrated in the 
regressions in Table 3.2. A significant correlation is also apparent when other controls are added 
(columns (2) and (3)) or alternative measures of performance are used such as profitability, sales 
growth and firm survival (columns (4) through (6)). Of course none of these results are causal in the 
sense that cross-sectional correlations between HR and productivity may be driven by reverse 
causality, or correlations with other omitted factors as discussed above.  
 
Some studies have tried to get a better handle on causation by using panel data on management 
practices to try and control for fixed cross-sectional differences between firms. In Black and Lynch 
(2004) the authors analyzed a second wave of the EQW-NES data so they could examine changes 
between 1996 and 1993. Again, some practices (such as profit related pay) showed up as informative 
in the cross section, but HRM practices were usually insignificant after controlling for fixed effects 
(only “re-engineering was significant). Cappelli and Neumark (2001) come to a similar conclusion also 
examining the same data. 
 
Since many of these practices appear to be highly correlated some researchers have aggregated them 
into a smaller number of summary measures. Huselid (1995) and Huselid and Becker (1996) did this in 
combining questions of his survey of HR managers into two principal components – “employee skills 
and organization” and “employee motivation”. They found that in the cross section one or other of 
these factors was positively and significantly related to productivity, profitability and Tobin‟s Q. 
However, like Black and Lynch (2004), once fixed effects were included these factors were not 
significant.  
 
The disappointing results for the absence of any “effect” in the time series dimension could be due to 
the fact that there genuinely is no relationship between productivity and HRM practices. Under this 
interpretation the cross sectional results are due to a spurious correlation with a time-invariant 
unobservable. Alternatively, there may be a downward endogeneity bias in the time-series because, for 
example, because negative productivity shocks are positively correlated with the introduction of new 
practices. Nickell, Nicolistsas and Patterson (2001) argue that firms organizationally innovate when 
they are doing badly and this would cause such a downward bias. Another factor is measurement error, 
which if it is of the classical form can cause attenuation bias towards zero. This is likely to be 
particularly problematic for HRM practices if they do not change much over time and are measured 
with substantial error.  
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 3.3.2 Individual Incentive Pay  
 
A pioneering study is Lazear (2000) who looked at the replacement of a flat rate hourly pay system by 
a piece rate pay system for windshield installers in the Safelite Glass Company. In this firm each 
employee has a truck and drives to the homes of people who have broken car windshields and installs a 
new one. Looking 19 months before and after the introduction of the incentive pay plan, Lazear found 
that productivity increased by around 44% after the policy change, with about half of this due to 
selection effects and half from the same individuals changing their behavior. The selection effects are 
because less productive workers left the company and more productive workers joined, presumably 
attracted by the higher powered incentives. 
 
More recently, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007) engineered a change in the incentive pay system 
for managers in a UK fruit farm. All the workers (fruit pickers) were on piece rate pay, but prior to the 
policy change the managers were paid a flat rate, whereas afterwards there was a strong element of pay 
tied to the performance of the workers they managed. The average picker‟s productivity rose by 21% 
after the introduction of performance related pay and at least half of this was due to improved 
selection. The remainder of the effect is due to managers focusing their efforts more on the workers 
were it had the greatest marginal effect. Examining the mechanism through which this happened, 
Bandiera et al (2009a) gathered information on social connections from their survey. They found that 
prior to the introduction of incentive pay managers favored workers to whom they were socially 
connected irrespective of the workers‟ ability. After the introduction of performance bonuses they 
targeted their efforts towards high ability workers regardless of whether they were socially connected 
or not. This had the effect of increasing the dispersion of productivity (as well as the level). 
 
Freeman and Kleiner (2005) examine the elimination of piece rates for a US shoe manufacturer. They 
focused on two plants of the same firm who switched at different times and focused on what happened 
to productivity (monthly shoes produced per worker) and profits before and after the change in the pay 
scheme. Consistent with the other “insider” studies, productivity fell after the workers were put on a 
flat hourly rate. Interestingly, the authors show that profits rose after the change which they attribute in 
part to improved quality with flat pay, plus a variety of other managerial changes complementary to 
flat rate pay. 
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A criticism of these studies is that the workers who are treated are not random. The firm who 
introduced the policy presumably believed there would be some benefits from doing so, thus it is hard 
to rule out the idea that there may have been some other contemporaneous change that affects worker 
productivity. Shearer (2004) addresses this problem in his study of tree planters in British Columbia. 
He worked with the company employing the planters and designed an experiment where all workers 
were randomly assigned to the incentive pay group for some days and flat hourly time rates for others 
(so the same worker is observed under both systems). He cannot look at selection effects, but found 
that the pure incentive effect was to increase productivity by around 22%, very similar to Lazear 
(2000).  
 
Another example of cleaner identification is Lavy (2009) who exploits a quasi-experiment in Israeli 
schools where teachers were offered individual bonuses based on their relative performance as 
indicated by pupil scores in math and English exams. School assignment was based on a rule 
determined by past matriculation results and this gives several identification methods including a 
regression discontinuity design around the threshold. He finds significant improvements in teacher 
performance and no evidence of distortions. Interestingly, the improvement in performance appeared 
to be due to changes in teaching methods and management. Not all evaluations of performance pay for 
teachers are so positive, although Lavy‟s (2007) survey does suggest that the weight of evidence is in 
favor and more so for individual incentive pay than for group incentives, which we turn to in the next 
sub-section. 
 
In summary, these studies do suggest that individual incentive pay increases productivity. Other 
studies also show evidence that incentives affect employee behavior, but the precise “incentive effect” 
on productivity are not so easy to interpret10. 
 
 3.3.3 Group Incentive Pay  
In Section 2 we saw that collective payment by results (such as team bonuses) has become much more 
important over the last 30 years or so. In the US almost half of employees participate in such schemes 
(see Section 2). There has been a recent review of the effects of such schemes in Blasi, Freeman, 
Mackin and Kruse (2009) who consider over 100 studies. In general a positive association is revealed 
between group incentive schemes and company performance, but with substantial diversity in results. 
The average estimated increase in productivity associated with employee ownership and profit sharing 
                                                 
10 For example see Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2004); Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton (1994) and Fernie and 
Metcalf (1999). 
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is 4.5%11. A survey of UK schemes by the UK Treasury (Oxera, 2007) found a mean effect across 
studies of 2.5% and larger effects for share ownership schemes12. Combinations of such schemes with 
other HRM practices were found to be particularly effective – e.g. employee involvement in teams. 
 
A recent example of this literature would be Bryson and Freeman (2009) who use the 2004 UK WERS 
survey discussed in Section 2 to relate various measures of company performance to the presence of 
incentive pay. They find that employee share ownership schemes are associated with 3.3% high value 
added per worker compared to no other form of incentive pay, but other forms of group incentive pay 
are insignificant. As with most of the other studies, the problem is that there are many potential 
omitted variables that are not controlled for, so we are concerned whether this is a causal effect or 
simply an association with an unobservable13. Jones and Kato (1995) go one step further as they have 
panel data on ESOPs and bonuses in Japanese firms. Switches to ESOPS were associated with 4-5% 
higher productivity after 3-4 years. Although panel data is an improvement, there is still the problem 
that the adopting firms are non-random as discussed in sub-section 3.2. 
 
Boning, Ichinowski and Shaw (2007) examine the introduction of team-based systems (including 
group incentive pay) in a distinct product line across 36 mini-mills. These mini-mills take scrap metal 
and recycle it into steel bars used, for example, in freeways. They find team-based work (including 
team bonuses) are associated with 6% higher productivity, especially in more complex products which 
indicates the importance of the complementarity between HRM and the wider strategy of the firm (see 
sub-section 3.4).  
 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) study the shift by a US garments manufacturer from individual 
pay towards group pay (“gain-sharing”). This coincided with a more general change in the firm‟s 
production strategy to produce smaller more custom-made batches (reflecting demand from their major 
customer – retail clothing stores).  This “modular” approach required more team work so group 
bonuses were more appropriate incentives. Productivity rose by about 18% and this increase was 
stronger for more heterogeneous teams. The authors suggest that this came from exploiting unused 
collaborative skills of workers. Surprisingly given the free rider problem, the more productive workers 
                                                 
11 On employee ownership see Kruse and Blasi (1997). On profit-sharing and gain-sharing see Weitzman and Kruse (1990).  
12 10 of the 13 studies of profit related pay were positive and 7 out of the 10 studies of share ownership. 
13 The study does not control for capital inputs or fixed effects, although some of the other studies do. 
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were earlier to switch. This suggests some non-pecuniary benefits and also positive peer effects (see 
below)14.  
 
Boning et al (2007) and Hamilton et al (2003) have the advantage that some of the unobservable 
shocks are controlled for by focusing on a narrower group of individuals (working in a single industry 
or a single firm). Although they still face the issue of endogeneity as there is no random assignment, 
their intimate knowledge of the change enables them to examine the mechanisms through which group 
pay influences productivity in a richer manner. Bloom et al. (2010) do randomly assign firms to 
interventions including the introducing performance related pay and find a 10% improvement in 
productivity. 
 
Burgess et al (2007) obtain something that is closer to random assignment by examining the 
introduction of a group incentive system in the UK tax collection agency. The preliminary results from 
this work suggest that group bonuses were effective in significantly raising productivity. Also in the 
public sector, Lavy (2002) finds that group bonuses for Israeli school teachers were highly effective in 
raising performance (compared to simply increasing school resources). Schools were given awards for 
improvements in dropout rates, matriculation rates and credits. The effects were stronger for weak 
students. Finally, Baiker and Jacobson (2007) find that group incentives in the form of keeping a 
greater share of the value of seized assets caused police productivity to rise in catching drug offences. 
 
In summary, there does then, appear to be evidence that group incentive schemes also raise 
productivity which is surprising given the free rider problem. Overall, the evidence is weaker here than 
that for individual incentive pay, in our opinion. 
 
3.3.4 Distortions due to incentive pay 
 
The studies in the previous sub-sections suggested that individuals do respond to pay incentives and 
generally in a way that usually increases productivity. The theoretical literature has emphasised many 
ways in which incentive pay can cause distortions which could reduce productivity. First, employees 
are more risk averse than firms and incentive pay increases the risks faced by workers. Thus it may 
discourage some high ability (but risk averse) workers from joining the firm and encourage excessive 
                                                 
14 Knez and Simester (2001) also found productivity increases following the promise of a company-wide bonus for 
improvements in on-time takeoffs in Continental Airways. 
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risk taking15. Second, firms cannot always credibly commit to reward performance ex post. For 
example, Gibbons (1987) details a model where only the worker knows the difficulty of job and the 
true action. He shows how this generates a “ratchet effect” where workers will restrict output unless 
the employer can commit not to use the information it obtains from learning the difficulty of the task. 
Third, measures of the worker‟s productivity are imperfectly related to inputs (worker effort). Baker 
(1992) shows how incentive pay tied to a measureable output will cause workers to increase effort to 
improve the measured output and reduce effort on the unmeasured output (e.g. quantity instead of 
quality in Lazear, 1986)16. 
 
Given the difficulty with tying incentives to objective measures what about the common practice of 
using supervisors‟ subjective measures of performance? Several papers have modeled the optimal mix 
of incentives based on imperfect objective measures and perfect (but unverifiable) subjective 
measures17. The problem with subjective measures is that although they provide stronger incentives 
workers have to trust that the firm does not renege ex post, which is a particular danger with 
unverifiable information. Furthermore, there will still be the problem of the gap between actual and 
measured effort. This can mean (i) employees engage in “influence activity” to alter supervisors‟ 
decisions in their favor (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1988)18; (ii) there may be favoritism on the behalf 
of supervisors for particular workers (Prendergast and Topel, 1996)19; (iii) the supervisor and 
employee may hold different opinions about employee‟s performance (MacLeod, 2003). 
 
Empirical work has tended to focus on the potential distortions in explicit incentive schemes. One key 
distortion that occurs is the measurement period. Asch (1990) examines US Navy recruiters who were 
incentivized based on their ability to enlist sailors (partly through measurement and some also through 
explicit payments). This was based on annual quotas, so only affected those who were close to missing 
their quota. In addition, the effect was extremely strong near year end, but weak afterwards, causing 
inconsistent efforts over time. Courty and Marshke (2004) analyze managers of job training centers 
and show that managers work very hard at the end of the measurement period, but generated some 
                                                 
15 Much of the remuneration of many financial workers, such as traders is based on an annual bonus. Since this can never 
be less than zero it may encourage excessively risky positions. 
16 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have a similar finding in the context of a multi-tasking model where incentive contracts 
can cause agents to under or over invest sub-optimally in different tasks. This could explain the well-known phenomenon 
of “teaching to the test”. This what led performance related pay to increase productivity but reduce productivity in Freeman 
and Kleiner (2005), as workers measured increased output of shoes but at the expense of unmeasured quality. 
17 For example see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). 
18 This may be a reason why some firms commit to promoting based on seniority rather than subjective assessments of 
performance. 
19 MacLeod (2003) shows how this will act as a multiplier effect on discrimination, making the discriminated group suffer 
further from lower effort. 
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costs in the form of lower training quality. Glewwe, Elias and Kremer (2003) examined a school-wide 
incentives program in Kenya. The program randomly assigned fifty elementary schools to a treatment 
group eligible for monetary incentives (21-43% of monthly salary). All teachers in winning schools 
received rewards based on average test score performance and dropout rates. Student scores improved 
significantly in the treatment schools for the two years the program was in place. But this appeared to 
be due solely to teachers conducting test preparation outside of regular class and there were no long-
run effects on pupil performance. This appeared to be a classic case of incentives simply causing 
“teaching to the test”. 
 
One might think that since these are examples from the public sector it is no surprise that incentives 
are poorly designed. Yet there are also many private sector examples. Oyer (1998) shows that firms 
typically build incentives around fiscal years. Consequently, firms sell more (at lower margins) near 
the end of the fiscal year compared to the middle of the year, and even less just at the start of the 
accounting year. Larkin (2007) looks at large software company and shows that salesmen acted on 
their incentives to shift effort towards the end of their measurement period. Compared to the 
counterfactual of no incentive contracts it is unclear whether these imperfect incentive contracts reduce 
overall productivity (although Larkin argues that there is a 6-8% cost in potential revenue)20.   
 
A more subtle form of distortion can occur between types of individual incentive pay systems when 
workers have social preferences. Many economists (e.g. Lazaer, 1989) have puzzled over why relative 
performance benchmarks are not used more commonly in pay systems given their desirable properties 
(i.e. common time specific shocks outside the employees‟ control are removed). Bandiera, Barankay 
and Rasul (2005) examined a change of incentive pay among workers their firm from a system based 
on relative performance to piece rates based on absolute performance. They found that productivity 
increased by 50% as a result of the experiment and attributed this to the fact that workers have social 
preferences (using their measures of friendship networks). Under a relative performance system a 
worker who increases his effort puts a negative externality on other workers under a relative system, 
but has no such affect under a piece rate system. 
 
Overall, there is clear evidence that distortions often in response to incentive pay schemes, especially 
when badly designed. Nevertheless, the evidence that many performance pay schemes – whether 
                                                 
20 Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that calendar year non-linearities lead to persistent distortions for mutual fund 
managers risk profiles. These are not chosen by the firm, however. We have even personally exploited year end incentives 
to buy cheap data in the past by agreeing with a salesman that he can choose each year which quarter we buy data from him 
(so he can use this to hit a quarterly target he would otherwise narrowly miss) in return for a 50% reduction in price. 
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individual or group - can raise productivity suggests that these distortions are not generally 
overwhelming. 
 
 3.3.5 Labor Unions 
A related literature is on the productivity impact of labor unions, an important human resource policy 
choice (see Freeman and Medoff, 1984). One recent attempt at an identification strategy here is 
DiNardo and Lee (2004) who exploit a regression discontinuity design. In the US a unions must win a 
National Labor Relations Board election to obtain representation, so one can compare plants just above 
the 50% cut-off to plants just below the 50% cut-off to identify the causal effects of unions. In contrast 
to the rest of the literature, DiNardo and Lee (2004) find no effect of unions on productivity, wages 
and most other outcomes. The problem, of course, is that union effects may only “bite” when the union 
has more solid support from the workforce. Farber (this volume) discusses labor unions in more detail. 
 
More generally, there is the question of whether unions inhibit incentive pay. Arguments can be made 
both ways. Although figure 2.1 is suggestive of the rise in incentive pay moving in the opposite way to 
the fall in union power and unions are certainly associated with lower pay dispersion within firms, 
Brown (1990) found no relationship with performance pay.  
 
3.4  Complementarities  
 
One of the key reasons why firms may find it difficult to adjust their organizational form is that there 
are important complementarities between sets of organizational practices. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
build a theoretical structure where such complementarities (or more precisely, super-additivities) mean 
that firms optimally choose clusters of practices that “fit together”. When the environment change so 
that an entrant firm would use this group of optimal practices, incumbent firms will find it harder – 
they will either switch a large number together or none at all.  
 
This has important implications for productivity analysis. The effects of introducing a single practice 
will be heterogeneous between firms and depend on what practices they currently use. This implies 
linear regressions of the form of equation (1) may be misleading. To see this consider that rather than a 
single HRM practice ( itd ) there are two management practices, m
1 and m2 and their relationship with 
productivity is such that TFP (the ity  considered here) increases by more when they are used together.  
 
27 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 12 ( * )it it it it it i t ity c m m m m                                                     (4) 
 
A simple version of the complementary hypothesis is 12 0  . A stronger form is that the disruption 
caused by just using one practice used alone actually reduced productivity, 1 20, 0   . In this case a 
regression which omits the interaction term may actually only find only a zero coefficient on the linear 
terms. 
 
The case study literature emphasizes the importance of complementarities. Econometrically, testing for 
their existence poses some challenges, however, as pointed out most clearly by Athey and Stern 
(1998). A common approach is a regression of practice 1 on practice 2 (and more) with a positive 
covariance (conditional on other factors) indicating complementarity. It is true that complements will 
tend to covary positively, but this is a very weak test. There could be many other unobservables 
causing the two practices to move together. Essentially, we need instrumental variables for at least one 
of the practices (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2007), but this is hard to obtain as it is unclear what such an 
instrument would be - how could it be legitimately excluded from the second stage equation? In 
classical factor demand analysis we would examine the cross price effects to gauge the existence of 
Hicks-Allen complements versus substitutes, i.e. does demand for practice 1 fall when the price of 
practice 2 rises (all else equal). Analogously, we would like to observe some cost shock to the 
adoption of practice 1 that is uncorrelated with the error term in the practice 2 adoption equation. 
Unfortunately, such tests are particularly hard to implement because there are generally not market 
prices for the organizational factors we are considering. 
 
An alternative strategy is to work straight from the production function (or performance equation more 
generally). In an influential paper Ichinowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997) estimate a version of 
equation (4) using very disaggregate panel data on finishing lines in integrated US steel mills using 
eleven human resource practices (including incentive pay, recruitment, teamwork, job flexibility and 
rotation). Their measure of productivity is based on downtime - the less productive lines were idle for 
longer. They find that introducing one or two practices has no effect, but introducing a large number 
together significantly raises productivity. Although the endogeneity problem is not eliminated, the 
controls for fixed effects, looking at very disaggregated data and a performance measure suited to the 
sector (downtime) helps reduce some of the more obvious sources of bias. Gant, Ichinowski and Shaw 
(2002) show that the productivity benefits of team working in steel plants appear to be due to faster 
problem solving because of tighter horizontal interactions and networks between workers. They use 
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detailed surveys of who is talking to who to show that plants involved with innovative HRM systems 
have this feature. 
 
In addition to endogeneity concerns, there is a further problem with interpreting a positive estimate of 
12  in equation (1) as evidence of complementarities. The true model may be one where there is a 
single latent factor for “good HRM management” and the many individual HRM measures may be 
(noisy) signals of this latent factor. This will generate positive covariance between the practices and 
could also cause the interaction to be positive. Thus, some care is required in the interpretation of the 
production function coefficients. 
 
Another aspect is the complementarity between HRM practices and other features of the firm. New 
technology is often discussed in this context and we turn to this next (see also section 5). 
 
3.5  The Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
 
One of the key productivity puzzles of recent years has been why the returns to the use of information 
and communication technologies appear to be so high and so heterogeneous between firms and 
between countries. For example, Brynjolffson and Hitt (2003) find that the elasticity of output with 
respect to ICT capital is far higher than its share in gross output (see also Stiroh, 2004). This reversed 
the well known Solow Paradox that one could find computers everywhere except the productivity 
figures. Not only was there evidence for large and significant returns at the micro-level, US 
productivity growth accelerated at the macro level from 1995 onwards. A substantial fraction of this 
appears to be linked to the production and use of ICT (e.g. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2008), and the 
greater pay-off to ICT usage seems to be a reason why European productivity growth was much slower 
than that in the US since the mid 1990s (ending the catching up process). 
 
One explanation for these phenomena was that effective use of ICT also requires significant changes in 
firm organization. Changing the notation of (4) slightly we could write 
 
( * )it c it it cm it ity c m c m u                                                (5) 
 
Where c in ln(ICT capital) and m is an HRM practice. The hypothesis that cm >0 would be consistent 
with complementarity between some HRM practices and ICT. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
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(2002) try to test this directly by surveying the organizations of large US firms on decentralization and 
team work (for a cross section) and combining this with data on ICT (from a private company Harte-
Hanks) and productivity from Compustat. They find evidence that cm >0. Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen (2010) broaden the sample to cover firms in seven European countries and find evidence of 
complementarity of ICT with the Bloom-Van Reenen measure of HR management discussed in 
Section 2.  They also show that their results are robust to controlling for firm fixed effects. Careful 
econometric case studies (e.g. Baker and Hubbard, 2004; Bartel, Ichinowski and Shaw, 2007) also 
identify differential productivity effects of ICT depending on organization form. We will return to the 
issues of complementarity between HRM, technology and human capital in section 5. 
 
 
4 Two perspectives on HRM and productivity: Design and Technology 
 
In thinking about the reasons for variations in HRM and productivity a contrast can be drawn between 
two possible approaches. The first, which is the now classic approach of Personnel Economics we 
label the “design” approach. The view here is that the HRM practices we observe are chosen by a 
profit maximising firm: they are explicit strategic choices of the firm, and variations in HRM reflect 
variations in the firm‟s environment.  
 
A second approach is becoming more common but has not been closely linked to labor economics. We 
label this the “managerial technology” approach because of the recent stress in diverse fields of 
economics, such as trade, public and macro, but above all Industrial Organization that there are large 
and persistent differences in firm productivity (see sub-section 2.2 above). In this view some aspects of 
HRM could be considered as a technology or “best practice” in the jargon. Adopting these forms of 
HRM would improve productivity in a typical firm. This leads on naturally to the question of why all 
firms have not adopted such practices. We discuss this below, but one immediate explanation is that all 
technologies have some diffusion curve whereby not all firms immediately adopt them. For example, it 
took American car manufacturers decades to accept and then implement Japanese style “lean 
manufacturing” techniques pioneered by Toyota. Informational constraints (and other factors we 
discuss below) could be an explanation for the slow diffusion of major managerial innovations. 
 
The firm heterogeneity inherent in the managerial technology perspective mirrors the traditional labor 
economist‟s emphasis on heterogeneity amongst workers. Interestingly, the many recent contributions 
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in labor economics have found that fundamental features of the labor market such as the persistent 
dispersion in equilibrium wage distribution for similar workers cannot be easily understood without 
appealing to some sort of firm heterogeneity (e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Cahuc, Postel-Vinay 
and Robin, 2006). Such models are generally silent on how this firm heterogeneity comes about, but 
their existence seems important in quantitatively matching features of wage dispersion in real labor 
markets.  
 
The Design and Technology perspectives are not mutually exclusive, of course. As economists, we 
believe that there is always some element of maximization. The managerial technology perspective 
highlights, however, that some firms are constrained by being less productive than others. We believe 
that this is an important empirical phenomenon which can explain many puzzling facts and requires 
integration into the dominant design paradigm. We overview both perspectives and refer readers who 
want more depth to the surveys in Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Malcomson (1999), Prendergast 
(1999), Lazear (1999) and especially Lazear and Oyer (2009) which summarizes the most recent 
theory and some more recent empirical evidence.  
 
4.1 The Design Perspective 
 
The economics of contracts (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, for an overview) and the economics of 
organizations (see Gibbons and Roberts, 2009) have made huge strides in recent decades. HRM or 
Personnel economics is a sub-class of this broader field with a focus on explaining the type of 
institutions we observe in real employment contracts and organization.  
 
Prior to the emergence of Personnel economics, the study of HRM was dominated by industrial 
psychologists and sociologists who emphasised institutions and culture as determining the internal 
organization of firms. Generalizations were eschewed. Traditionally labor economists focused on labor 
demand and supply, unemployment and investment in education, issues that saw the firm as a single 
unit rather than a complex organization and so had little to directly say on the structure of pay, 
promotions and design of work within firms. This started changing in the 1970s partly as new 
techniques of agency and contract theory allowed a more systematic treatment of activity inside 
companies.  
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The design perspective borrows three key principles from economics. First, firms and workers are 
rational maximizing agents (profits and utility respectively). Secondly, it is assumed that labor and 
product markets must reach some sort of price-quantity equilibrium, which provides some discipline 
for the models. Finally, the stress is very much on private efficiency with an emphasis on why some 
employment practices which may look to be perplexing and inefficient on the surface (e.g. mandatory 
retirement and huge pay disparities for CEOs) may actually be (at least privately) optimal.  
 
The key feature of the design approach is that the HRM practices we observe are chosen by firms to 
maximize profits in an environment that departs from perfectly competitive spot markets. Unlike the 
standard Personnel Management texts, Personnel Economics leads to sharper predictions and 
generalizations: it is not the case that “every workplace is fundamentally different”. However, the 
design approach puts the reason for heterogeneity in the adoption of different practices as mainly due 
to the different environments firms face – say in the industry‟s technology, rather than inefficiencies. 
The managerial technology view, described next, sees a large role for inefficiencies. 
 
4.2 The managerial technology perspective 
 
4.2.1 What are HRM best practices? 
 
The large dispersion in firm productivity discussed in sub-section 2.2 motivates an alternative 
perspective that some types of HRM (or bundles of HRM practices) are better than others for firms in 
the same environment. There are three types of these best practices. First, there are some practices that 
have always been better throughout time and space (e.g. not promoting gross incompetents to senior 
positions) or collecting some information before making decisions. Second, there may be genuine 
managerial innovations (Taylor‟s Scientific Management; Toyota‟s Lean Manufacturing System; 
Demming‟s Quality movement, etc.) in the same way there are technological innovations. There are 
likely to be arguments over the extent to which an innovation is real technical progress or just a fad or 
fashion. It is worth recalling that this debate historically occurred for many of the “hard” technological 
innovations which take for granted now such as computers and the Internet.  Thirdly, many practices 
may have become optimal due to changes in the economic environment over time, as the design 
perspective highlights. Incentive pay may be an example of this: piece rates declined dramatically in 
the late 19th Century, but incentive pay appears to be making somewhat of a comeback (see sub-
section 2.1.1). Lemieux et al (2008) suggest that this may be due to advances in ICT – companies like 
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SAP make it much easier to measure output in a timely and robust fashion, making effective incentive 
pay schemes easier to design21. In these circumstances, some firms may be faster than others in 
switching to the new best practice. The differential speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium can be 
due to information differences, complementarities (see sub-section 3.4) and agency issues. 
 
Notice that there is nothing in what we have said which is specifically tied to HR in this description. If 
productivity dispersion is due (at least in part) to differential managerial quality then this applies both 
to the HR and non-HR parts. We next examine some of the theories of management that could help 
account for productivity dispersion (of which HRM is a subset). 
 
4.2.2 Theories of management quality 
 
The large-scale productivity dispersion described in Section 2 poses serious challenges to the 
representative firm approach. It has always been germane to Industrial Organization, but there has 
been a wholesale re-evaluation of theoretical approaches in several fields. For example, in 
international trade the dominant paradigm has already started to shift towards heterogeneous firm 
models. This is due to the increasing weight of empirical evidence documenting the persistent 
heterogeneity in firm export patterns (exporters tend to be larger and more productive). Melitz (2003) 
follows Hopenhayn (1992) in assuming that firms do not know their productivity before the pay a sunk 
cost to enter an industry, but when they enter they receive a draw from a known distribution. 
Productivity does not change over time and firms optimize subject to their constraint of having high or 
low productivity. Firms who draw a very low level of productivity will immediately exit as there is 
some fixed cost of production they cannot profitably cover. Those who produce will have a mixture of 
productivity levels, however. A natural interpretation of this set-up is that entrepreneurs found firms 
with a distinct managerial culture which is imprinted on them until they exit, so some firms are 
permanently “better” or “worse” managed. Over time, the low productivity firms are selected out and 
the better ones survive and prosper. There is some stochastic element to this, however, so in the steady 
state there will always be some dispersion of productivity. 
 
Identifying the permanent productivity advantage in this model as “managerial quality” is consistent 
with the tradition in the panel data econometric literature. Indeed, Mundlak‟s (1961) introduction of 
the original fixed effects panel data model was designed to control for this unmeasured managerial 
                                                 
21 Hard technological advances have also facilitated managerial innovations such as Just in Time. Keane and Feinberg 
(2007) stress the importance of these improved logistics for the growth of intra-firm trade between the US and Canada.  
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ability (the title of his paper was “Empirical Production Function Free of Management Bias”). Rather 
than just treat this as a nuisance parameter however, more recent attempts have tried to measure 
management directly. 
 
Imperfect competition is one obvious ingredient for these models. With imperfect competition firms 
can have differential efficiency and still survive in equilibrium. With perfect competition inefficient 
firms should be rapidly driven out of the market as the more efficient firms undercut them on price. In 
Syverson (2004b), for example, there is horizontal product differentiation based on transport costs so 
firms have local market power. He shows theoretically and empirically that increases in competition 
will increase average productivity by reducing the mass of less productive plants in an area. 
 
Another important element is “frictions”. Costs of adjustment are ubiquitous in capital investment and 
have usually been found for labor, especially skilled labor (see Bond and Van Reenen, 2007, and 
Bloom 2009 for surveys). Thus, firms facing asymmetric shocks will adjust differentially to their new 
conditions only slowly over time even if they all have identical adjustment cost technologies. In such 
an environment, low TFP firms will not immediately vanish as there is an option value to remaining 
active in the sector. The Melitz model could be regarded as a limiting case of introducing frictions 
where the TFP draw cannot be altered over time by say investing in improving management. The 
managerial factor is “trapped” as there is no direct market for it as it cannot be transferred between 
firms. When the firm exits, so does the productivity advantage – entrepreneurs take a new draw if they 
enter again. In reality, adjustment costs can take more general forms and are likely to be important as 
management practices and organizational forms can adjust.  
 
The management quality measures in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) can be interpreted as the 
permanent draw from the productivity distribution when firms are born. Alternatively, it may reflect 
that some individuals have superior managerial skill and can maintain a larger span of control as in 
Lucas (1978). More generally, management quality could evolve over time due to investments in 
training, consultancy, etc.  
 
A common feature of these models is that management is partially like a technology, so there are 
distinctly good (and bad) practices that would raise (or lower) productivity. We believe that this is an 
important element in management quality, and the traditional models that seek to understand 
technological diffusion (e.g. Hall, 2003) are relevant for understanding the spread of managerial 
techniques.  
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4.2.3 “Behavioral” explanations of management 
 
None of the exposition of the Managerial Technology perspective has relied on any “Behavioral 
economics”, in the sense of non-optimizing agents. Of course, one potential explanation for the non 
adoption of seemingly profitable HRM practices could be behaviorally based. One line of the literature 
focuses on managerial over-confidence, in which managers are excessively optimistic about their own 
abilities and the investment returns of their firms. In the case of HRM they may believe their current 
policies are optimal and so no changes are needed. The other focuses on managerial faults like 
procrastination towards undertaking profitable activities, so they may believe they need to adopt more 
modern HRM practices but repeatedly defer actually doing this. 
 
Managerial overconfidence 
This builds on the well known result from the psychology literature showing routine overconfidence in 
individuals over their abilities. For example, Svenson (1981) showed that 82% of students placed their 
driving ability in the top 30%. Exacerbating this is attribution bias, whereby managers attribute good 
performance to their own ability, despite this often being due to luck, leading to more senior managers 
to become increasing overconfident. Since senior managers often have few peers to correct them, this 
type of over-confidence can persist. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident managers – 
defined as those who hold excessively hi portfolios of their companies share (failing to diversify) - 
undertake excessively high investments that are less profitable on average, less well regarded by stock-
markets and more internally financed22. 
 
Procrastination 
Another literature has pointed out the procrastination – or failure to take known optimal actions – by 
individuals and managers. For example, Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2009) show how Kenyan maize 
farmers do not use fertilizer despite returns of over 100% to the investment, unless they are provided 
with some form of commitment mechanism like advanced buying of the fertilizer. Similarly, Conley 
and Udry (2009) show how pineapple farmers in Ghana also under-use fertilizer in their farms, again 
                                                 
22 Likewise the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) survey asked managers the question “Excluding yourself, please score your 
firms management practices on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is worst practice, 10 is best practice and 5 is average”. The 
average response from managers was 7.1, and was correlated at only 0.035 with each firm‟s actual labor productivity. This 
suggests that to the extent that managers are reporting their self assessment accurately, they are substantially over rating 
their managerial ability, and also struggling to benchmark this against their actual management ability. 
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despite having the resources to purchase this and without any superior savings mechanism. This type 
of behavior is certainly not limited to developing countries – for example, Choi, Laibson and Madrian 
(2008) show that many employees of US firms are directly losing money from not making investments 
in 401K plans which have matching top-ups by employers and permit instant withdrawal . 
 
In all cases the behavior is irrational from a standard optimizing framework in that agents are aware of 
utility maximizing actions but do not take them. One framework for explaining these actions goes back 
to O‟Donoghue and Rabin (1999), who propose a model in which agents are present-biased and as 
least partially naïve, systematically underestimating the odds they will be impatient in the future. 
Hence, agents defer taking improving actions today under the belief they will take them in future, but 
never do. As a result agents repeatedly procrastinate on taking profitable actions, like introducing 
modern HRM practices into their firms. 
 
4.3 The two perspectives: Summary 
  
In the Design approach firms at every point are choosing their optimal set of management practices 
and no firm is more efficient than another based on these. In management science, “contingency 
theory” (e.g. Woodward, 1958) is akin to this. Any coherent theory of management has firms choosing 
different practices in different environments, so there will always be some element of contingency. For 
example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that firms appear to specialize more in investing in 
“people management” (practices over promotion, rewards, hiring and firing) when they operate in a 
more skill-intensive industry. If we examine the relative scores by country for monitoring and target 
setting practices compared to people management, the US, India and China have the largest relative 
advantage in people management, and Japan, Sweden and Germany the largest relative advantage in 
monitoring and target setting management. The systematic difference in the relative scores of different 
types of management across countries also suggests that there may be some specialization in areas of 
comparative advantage, perhaps due to labor market regulation. Figure 4.1 shows some evidence for 
this. The cross country differences in people management are related to the degree of labor market 
regulation (lightly regulated countries such as the US and Canada do better than heavily regulated 
countries such as France, Brazil and Greece).  
 
The interesting question is whether there really are any “universals”, i.e. some practices that would be 
unambiguously better for the majority of firms? If this is so, why are they not adopting them? The 
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answer to this question is identical to that of the adoption of any new technology – there are costs to 
adoption in the form of information, incentives, regulatory constraints, externalities, etc. These will 
vary somewhat by time and place and we turn to some of these factors next. 
 
 
5 Some determinants of HRM practices 
 
Given the dispersion in HRM practices and productivity outlined in section 2 we naturally turn to the 
question of why such variations exist. The large span of theories and empirical work makes it 
impossible to discuss all areas of the determinants of HRM, so focus on some key themes. 
 
5.1 Insurance and incentive pay 
 
One of the most basic features of performance pay from the design perspective is the incentive vs. 
insurance trade-off. A first best contract could be written on effort, but the essence of the principal 
agent problem is that the agent‟s effort is not perfectly observable. An obvious way to solve the 
principal agent problem is for the principal to sell the firm to the agent whose incentives would then be 
aligned with value maximization. This does sometimes happen in market stalls and some other 
contexts, but it is exceptional in the modern economy.  
 
A fundamental reason for this is that individuals are more risk averse than firms. A flat salary provides 
insurance to an employee because when the firm experiences a negative shock his wage will remain 
constant (assuming that he is not laid off). Consider a contract that is partially base salary and partially 
tied to a measure of employee output (a signal of effort). The observable measure of worker output is a 
function of effort and stochastic factors: these might be measurement error in the signal or truly 
exogenous shocks to output. The greater the variance of the noise relative to the signal, the greater is 
the risk that the employee is forced to bear. Thus, in order to attract the employee to supply his labor to 
the firm (the participation constraint), the lower will be the weight attached to the employee‟s 
measured output in the optimal contract. Thus, there is a trade-off between risks and incentives. 
 
Prendergast (1999) analyzed this in detail and lamented that the evidence here did not really give great 
support to the basic insurance-incentive trade off. For example, Garen (1994) examines the degree to 
which CEO compensation is linked to performance (the “β” in a linear contract). The relationship 
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between β and the noisiness of performance measures should be negative, but appeared to be 
statistically zero in his data. Brown (1990) examining a wider range of occupations also finds little 
relationship between incentive pay and the riskiness of the environment, 
 
Prendergast (2000, 2002a, 2002b) looks at this evidence in more detail and offers several possible 
explanations. In Prendergast (2002a) risky environments will be ones were the manager‟s private 
information is more valuable. This is because the uncertainty in this environment will make it much 
more likely that the agent knows what the “right” thing is to do rather than the principal. In such 
circumstances delegating decisions to the agent become more attractive. In other words, the increased 
cost of incentive pay in terms of lower insurance to an employee in a risky environment has also to be 
set against the higher value of employee‟s information. Thus, uncertain environments increase the 
value of giving more decision rights to employees which will increase the probability of incentive pay 
even though the insurance mechanism leans in the opposite way. Prendergast (2002a) hypothesizes 
that because the degree of delegation is hard to control for at the same time as environmental 
uncertainty, this is why the effects of uncertainty on incentive pay have been empirically ambiguous. 
 
Prendergast„s point is a specific example of a more general principle in terms of the incentives to 
decentralize when it is hard for the principal to learn about the “right action” in a noisy environment. 
We describe this model in more detail in sub-section 5.4 below and show that there is string of 
empirical evidence that more uncertain/heterogeneous environments do cause greater decentralization 
as Prendergast suggests (Acemoglu et al, 2007). Whether this resolves the empirical problem of 
insurance vs. incentive pay is still unclear, however23.  
 
 
5.2 Product Market Competition  
 
From the “management technology” perspective, it is clearer why competition has a positive effect on 
best practice HRM. Adam Smith, for example, wrote that “Monopoly...is a great enemy to good 
management.”24  Higher product market competition as indexed by say an increase in consumer price 
                                                 
23 There have been attempts to combine information on delegation and incentive pay (e.g. Adams, 2005 and DeVaro and 
Kurtulus, 2007), but both incentive pay and delegation are exogenous variables so some additional exogenous variation is 
needed to be conclusive. Wulf (2007) finds that for managers at the same level incentive pay is less prevalent when there is 
more volatility. More recent work has found some support for the incentives-risk trade off by gathering more direct 
measures of risk aversion (Bandiera et al, 2010) or modeling the matching process between principals and agents 
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002). 
24 The Wealth of Nations, Book I Chapter XI Part I , p.148 
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sensititivity will tend to drive the less productive firms out of the market. Firms have have failed to 
adopt better HR management practices will tend to exit, so this should imporve the HR management 
quality and productivity in the average firm. To the extent that incentive pay and some of the other 
Bloom and Van Reenen HR practices really so increase productivity, the time series trends identified 
in section 2 might be due to increases in global competition caused by deregulation and globalization. 
 
Effort to improve managerial practices may also increase through incentive effects on incumbent 
firms. Schmidt (1997) formalizes the intuition that tougher competition will bring the interests of the 
managerial agent more into line with the firm‟s owners. In his model managers have borrowing 
constraints so lose wealth when their firm goes bankrupt. High levels of competition increase 
bankruptcy risk and increase managerial effort. 
 
Theoretically, however, the effects of competition on the form of incentive pay is ambiguous from the 
design perspective. The analysis in Vives (2008) is very useful as he shows that higher powered 
incentives can be considerd in some respects as an investment in non-tournament R&D. The firm 
invests in an HR system that has a fixed cost but lowers marginal costs as the improved managementr 
increases productivity of all factors.  Consider again an increase in consumer price sensitivity as an 
index of product market competition. The “stakes” are now higher: through greater managerial effort a 
firm can reduce marginal costs this and will have a larger effect on relative market share or relative 
profitability than when competition is lower. On the other hand, higher competition means that profits 
are lower in the industry, so any given performance contract will generate lower expected benefits 
because for a given effort level the profit related part of pay will be lower. This is the standard 
Schumpeterian reason for expecting lower innovative effort in high competition industries.  
 
Vives (2008) shows that there are other forces at play when we allow endogenous entry and exit even 
for symmetric firms. In general, the average firm will be larger in equilibrium as the more intense 
competition induces exit, and the larger firms will have a greater incentive to introduce productivity 
increasing HR practices the fixed costs of introducing them over a large sales base. Thus, allowing for 
entry will tend to strengthen the positive effect of competition, as firms will in equilibrium be larger so 
have higher sales to spread fixed costs.  
 
What about the empirical evidence? The evidence from Figure 2.4 suggested that HR management 
practices were better in the US where competitive selection forces are likely to be very strong. More 
formally, we can look at the conditional correlation between the HR management score and indicators 
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of competitive intensity. Whether measured by trade openness, the industry inverse Lerner Index or 
simply the number of perceived rivals competition is robustly and positively associated with higher 
management practice scores both with and without firm fixed effects (see Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and 
Van Reenen, 2009). Note that the obvious endogeneity bias here is to underestimate the importance of 
competition as better managed firms are likely to have higher profit margins, lower import penetration 
ratios and drive out their rivals25. Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen (2010) use political 
competition as an instrumental variable to account for unusually high numbers of hospitals in some 
areas of the country in the UK public healthcare system (hospitals are rarely closed down in politically 
marginal constituencies). They find that the positive effects of competition grow stronger when 
endogeneity is taken explicitly into account.  
 
Consistent with these general results on the positive association of competition on explict measures of 
HR management, there is other evidence which also gets closer to causal effects when focuing 
explicitly on incentive pay. Guadalupe and Cunat (2009a) show that the pay-performance sensitivity 
for US CEOs is stronger when import competition is stronger (as measured by tariffs). Guadalupe and 
Cunat (2009b) they show a similar result using US banking deregulation as an exogenous shift to 
competition. And in Guadalupe and Cunat (2005) they also find that the correlation between pay and 
firm performance (for UK workers and exectutives) strengthens with competition using the exchange 
rate appreciation in 1996 which differentially affected traded and non-traded sectors.  
 
5.3 Ownership and governance  
 
The managerial technology perspective suggests that organizations with poor governance are less 
likely to use appropriate HR management techniques. In particular, there has been a lively debate on 
the performance effects of family firms (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Firms which  are both family 
owned and family run (typically by the eldest son – primogeniture) are very common, especially in 
developing countries. Figure 5.1 plots a the averages of the Bloom-Van Reenen HR management 
scores by ownership category. Firms that are family owned and family managed (“Family, family 
CEO”) tend to be badly managed on average, while the family owned but externally managed 
(“Family, external CEO”) look very similar to dispersed shareholders. Government-owned firms also 
score very managed, while firms owned by Private Equity score well. 
                                                 
25 There is a literature examining how incentive pay contracts can be used as commitment devices to tougher competition 
(e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). They find evidence of lower pay-performance sensitivity in firms with more volatile 
stock prices. 
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This finding is robust to more systematic controls for other covariates (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007).  Family ownership per se is not correlated with worse HR management practices, it is when 
family ownership is combined with the CEO being chosen as the eldest son that the quality of 
management appears to be very poor. This is consistent with the idea that limiting the talent pool to a 
single individual is not the optimal form of CEO selection. It is also consistent with Perez-Gonzalez 
(2006) and Bennesden, Nielson, Perez-Gonzales and Wolfenzon (2007) who find that inherited family 
control appears to cause worse performance. This result is strengthened by using the gender of the 
eldest child as an instrumental variable for family management as families usually only relinquish 
control and bring in external managers when faced with a severe crisis.  
 
Another dimension of ownership is whether the firm is domestic or multinational. Bloom, Genakos, 
Sadun and Van Reenen (2009 found that there is a “pecking order” in management scores with purely 
domestic firms at the bottom, firms that export but do not produce overseas next and multinational 
firms at the top26. This is broadly consistent with Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). In fact, 
multinational subsidiaries tend to have better HR management in every country (see Figure 5.2), 
consistent with the idea that they can “transplant” some of their HR practices overseas.  This is 
important as it suggests that a mechanism for management practices to diffuse internationally is 
through the investments of overseas firms. 
 
Some direct evidence on the importance of this mechanism is presented in Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen (2010). As noted in sub-section 3.5 they found that US firms appear to be much more effective 
in using IT to improve their productivity, and this in turn is related to American firms‟ greater use of 
modern HRM practices (incentive pay, careful hiring, rigorous appraisals and promotions, etc.). They 
show that the subsidiaries of US multinationals in Europe have higher IT productivity than comparable 
multinational affiliates, use more of these HRM practices and have higher productivity, primarily from 
their superior use of IT. They argue that the US advantage in HRM practices could account for about 
half of the faster productivity growth in the US (over Europe) post 1995. 
 
5.4 Work Organization: The example of decentralization  
An important aspect of HRM is work design – how are roles ascribed to different jobs? In this sub-
section we focus on one aspect of design which we label “decentralization”. For example, how many 
                                                 
26 Osterman (1994) also finds that firms who sell in international markets are more likely to have adopted an “innovative 
work practice (teams, job rotation, TQM or Quality Circles). 
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decision rights are delegated from the CEO to the plant manager? How much control over the pace of 
work is delegated from the plant manager to the production worker? This is perhaps the most widely 
studied theoretical aspect of the workplace after pay incentives and there is a smaller, but growing 
empirical literature. 
 
Note that decentralization is distinct from managerial spans of control. These are distinct concepts as 
the span and depth (number of levels) of a hierarchy are compatible with different power relationships 
between the levels. Nevertheless there is some evidence that the move towards delayering over the last 
twenty years has been associated with decentralization (see Rajan and Wulf, 2006), and we will touch 
on this below. 
 
5.4.1  Measurement of decentralization 
A key factor in any organization is who makes the decisions? A centralized firm is one were these are 
all taken at the top of the hierarchy and a decentralized firm is where decision-making is more evenly 
dispersed throughout the hierarchy. An extreme case of decentralized organization is a market 
economy where atomistic individuals make all the decisions and spot contract with each other. The 
origin of many of the debates on decentralization has their origins in the 1930s over the relative merits 
of a market economy relative to a centrally planned one.  
 
How can this concept be operationalized empirically? One way is to look at the organization charts of 
firms (“organogram”) as graphical representations of the formal authority structure. One of the best 
studies in this area is Rajan and Wulf (2006) who use the charts of over 300 large US corporations 
1987-1998 to examine the evolution of organizations (e.g. how many people directly report to the CEO 
as a measure of the span of control). They find that the number of people reporting to the CEO has 
been rising over the period because intermediate managers – particularly the COO (Chief Operations 
Offices) – have been removed. Whether the lower levels have obtained more power because their 
immediate bosses (the COOs) have gone, or less power because they are now dealing directly with the 
CEOs is not clear. What is clear is that these large US corporations have been delayering 
systematically over time by removing senior managerial layers, leading to more junior managers 
reporting directly in to the CEO. Hence, this highlights the differences between measuring 
organizational shape (the number of layers in an organization) and real power (where the actual 
decisions are made). 
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Observing whether a firm is decentralized into profit centers is useful, as this is a formal delegation of 
power - the head of such a business unit will be performance managed on profitability. If the firm is 
composed of cost (or revenue) centers this indicates less decentralization. If the firm does not even 
delegate responsibility at all, this is more centralized. Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and 
Zilibotti (2007, henceforth AALVZ) use this distinction. 
 
Unfortunately, as Max Weber and (more recently) Aghion and Tirole (1997) stressed, formal authority 
is not the same as real authority as the company organogram may not reflect where real power lies. A 
criticism of AALVZ is that just using profit centers as an indicator is rather crude and a better way is 
directly survey the firms themselves. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) measure decentralization 
from the central headquarters (CHQ) to the plant manager over investment, hiring, marketing and 
product introduction, and combine these four indictors into one (mean-zero) decentralization index. As 
with the index of management quality in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) decentralization displays 
considerable variation across firms. There is also a large difference across countries as shown in Figure 
5.3. Interestingly, the US, UK and Northern European countries are the most decentralized and 
Southern Europe and the Asian countries the most centralized.  
  
5.4.2 Theories of decentralization 
 
The basic trade off in the decentralization decisions is between the efficient use of local information 
(see Radner, 1993) favoring delegation and the principal-agent problem where the agent has weaker 
incentives to maximize the value of the firm than the principal (on the trade-off see Aghion and Tirole, 
1997). 
 
The benefits from decentralization arise from at least three sources. First, decentralizing decision-
making reduces the costs of information transfer and communication. In a hierarchical organization, 
information that has been processed at lower levels of the hierarchy has to be transferred upstream. 
This induces a cost due to the need that information be codified and then received and analyzed at 
various levels (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994). When decision-making is decentralized, information is 
processed at the level where it is used so that the cost of communication is lower. Second, 
decentralization increases firms‟ speed of response to market changes (Thesmar and Thoenig, 1999). 
One reason for this is that hierarchical organizations are characterized by a high degree of 
specialization of workers. Any response to market changes involves the coordination of a great number 
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of activities so that overall firm's reaction speed is low. When responsibility is transferred downstream, 
it is most often delegated to teams of workers, generally involved in multi-tasking. This allows a 
swifter reaction to market changes given that coordination involves a limited number of multi-skilled 
workers. Finally, decentralization of decision-making may increase productivity through rising job 
satisfaction. Delegation of responsibility goes along with more employee involvement, greater 
information sharing and a greater participation of lower level staff.  
 
Turning to the costs of decentralization, we highlight four of them. First, costs arise from the risk of 
duplication of information in the absence of centralized management. Workers are now in charge of 
analyzing new pieces of information. With decentralization the risk of replication in information 
processing increases, both across individuals and across teams. A related risk is that of an increase in 
the occurrence of “mistakes” as there is less co-ordination. A second standard cost is the loss of co-
ordination efficiencies as externalities between units are not internalized (e.g. plants producing 
substitutable products will tend to price too low) - see Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) for a 
general discussion. A third cost is that decentralization makes it more difficult to exploit returns to 
scale (Thesmar and Thoenig, 2000). The reason for this is that as multi-tasking develops returns to 
specialization decreases so that large-scale production becomes less beneficial. Finally, 
decentralization may reduce workers' efficiency if the increase in responsibility that it implies induces 
rising stress (Askenazy, 2001). In this case, productivity may be directly affected and/or reduced 
through lower job satisfaction.  
 
5.4.3 What influences decentralization? 
We divide our analysis into the examination of three groups of factors that influence decentralization: 
technological (complexity, ICT and heterogeneity), economic (human capital and competition) and 
cultural. 
 
Complexity 
Some basic factors determine decentralization. All else equal a larger firm will require more 
decentralization than a small firm. A sole entrepreneur does not need to delegate because he is his own 
boss, but as more workers are added, doing everything by himself is no longer feasible. Penrose (1959) 
and Chandler (1962) stressed that decentralization was a necessary feature of larger firms, because 
CEOs do not have the time to take every decision in large firms. Similarly as firms expand in their 
scope both geographically and in product space, local information will become more costly to transmit 
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so this will also favor decentralization. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) find that larger firms 
and plants owned by foreign multinationals are significantly more likely to be decentralized. This is 
likely to be because of increased complexity27. 
 
Information and Communication Technology 
Garicano (2000) formalizes the idea of the firm as a cognitive hierarchy. There are a number of 
problems to be solved and the task is how to solve them in the most efficient manner. The simplest 
tasks are performed by those at the lowest level of the hierarchy and the “exceptional” problems are 
passed upwards to an expert. The cost of passing problems upwards is that communication costs are 
non-trivial. The benefit of passing the problem upwards is that it economizes on the cognitive burden 
of lower level employees. 
 
This framework was designed to address the impacts of ICT. Interestingly, information technologies 
have different implications for decentralization than communication technologies. Consider again the 
decentralization decision between the central headquarters and plant manager. When communication 
costs fall through (for example) the introduction of a company intranet, it is cheaper for the plant 
manager to refer more decisions to the corporate officers. So communication technologies should 
cause centralization. By contrast, technologies that make it easier for the plant manager to acquire 
information (e.g. Enterprise Resource Planning software, ERP like SAP) means that decentralization 
should increase. An example in law firms would be Lexus Nexus that enables junior lawyers to 
quickly find relevant cases without consulting a more senior associate or partner. 
 
Bloom, Garicano, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) test this theory and find considerable empirical 
support. Computer networks (reducing communication costs) significantly increase centralization, 
whereas tools to help managers access more information significantly increase decentralization. The 
magnitude of the effect is substantial. An increase in the use of Enterprise Resource Planning usage by 
60% (the average difference in ICT between Europe and the US) is associated with an increase of the 
index of their plant manager‟s autonomy index by 0.025 which is equivalent to a large increase in the 
supply of human capital (roughly the same as the increase in US college graduates between 1990 and 
2000). The finding that information technology is a complement with a particular form of HRM 
(decentralization) is consistent the productivity evidence discussed in sub-section 3.5.  
 
                                                 
27 Colombo and Delmastro (2004) also find that complexity related variables are associated with decentralization in their 
Italian firms. 
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On experimental evidence Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts (2010) find that as 
management practices improve firms decentralize decision making. This is because better management 
practices improve information collection and dissemination, so the principals (the firm‟s owners) 
decentralize more decisions to their agents (the plant managers). With greater levels of information the 
owners are more relaxed about plant managers taking decisions as they know they can check the 
outcomes. For example, they know that if the plant managers start stealing output this will be much 
more rapidly detected with daily output monitoring, so is now far less likely to occur. 
 
Heterogeneity  
AALVZ present a model of decentralization in which firms learn about how to implement a new 
technology from other firms in their industry. The new technology on average improves productivity, 
but there is heterogeneity in the benefits from introducing it, so not all firms should do things in the 
same way. The set-up is of a principal (central headquarters) deciding whether or not to delegate to a 
local agent (plant manager) who is better informed about the technology but has imperfectly aligned 
incentives. As more firms experiment with the technology in the same industry the principal has a 
better public history of information about the right way to implement the new technology, so has less 
need to decentralize to the agent.  
 
One key result follows: the greater the heterogeneity of the industry the more decentralized will be the 
average firm. Heterogeneity here means that “right” way to implement the technology has a larger 
variance, so the opportunity to learn from other firms is circumscribed because what is good for my 
neighbor is less likely to be what is good for me. As discussed earlier, this is akin to Prendergast 
(2002a) – the more uncertain the environment the greater the value of local knowledge. Two other 
implications are that, first, the more innovative the technology (i.e. closer to the frontier), the less will 
be known about how to use it so the greater will be the likelihood of decentralization. Second, if a firm 
can learn from its past experience, older firms will be less likely to delegate than younger firms.  
 
AALVZ measure decentralization using both formal measures of whether firms are organized into 
profit centers and “real” survey measures of the power managers have over hiring decisions. Their 
results are illustrated in Figure 5.4, where Panel A shows there is an upward relationship between 
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decentralization and heterogeneity28, Panel B shows decentralization is higher among firms closer to 
the technological frontier, and Panel C shows older firms appear more centralized than younger firms. 
 
Human Capital 
One of the reasons for the renewed interest in organizational change by labor economists was the 
attempt to understand why technology seemed to increase the demand for human capital, and thus 
contribute to the rise in wage inequality experiences by the US, UK and other countries since the late 
1970s (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, 2008). Many theories have been proposed (see Autor, 
Levy and Murnane, 2003, for a review), but one hypothesis is that lower IT prices increased 
decentralization incentives for the reasons outlined in Garicano (2000)‟s model discussed above. 
Further, decentralization could be complementary with skills because more educated workers are 
better able to analyze and synthesize new pieces of knowledge so that the benefits of the local 
processing of information are enhanced. Second, the cost of training them for multi-tasking is lower 
and they are more autonomous and less likely to make mistakes.  
 
This has three main implications: (i) Decentralization leads to skill upgrading within firms. This is due 
to the fact that the return to new work practices is greater when the skill level of the workforce is 
higher; (ii) a lower price of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor will accelerate the introduction of 
organizational changes associated with decentralization; (iii) Skill intensive firms will experience 
greater productivity growth when decentralizing.  
 
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find support for all three predictions. They estimate production 
functions (with the relevant interactions), skill share equations and organizational design equations. A 
novel feature of this approach is that because labor is traded in a market, it is possible to use local skill 
price variation to examine the complementarity issues. They find that higher skill prices make 
decentralization less likely, consistent with “skill biased organizational change”29. 
 
Product Market Competition 
                                                 
28 The authors show that the anomalous first decile is due to the disproportionate number of older and less productive firms 
in this decile (this is controlled for in the regressions). Kastl, Martimort and Piccolo (2008) also find more innovative firms 
(as measured by R&D intensity) are more decentralized. 
29 Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) also find robust empirical evidence that firms with more skilled employees are 
more decentralized. Bartel, Shaw and Ichinowski (2007) also find human capital complementary with “innovative” HR 
practices. 
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If competition has made swift decisions more important than this will have increased the salience of 
local knowledge, leading to greater decentralization under the framework discussed above. Similarly if 
competition reduces the agency problem decentralization is more likely. There are countervailing 
forces however. For example, a larger number of firms help learning which in the AALVZ framework 
will reduce the need to decentralize. 
 
The empirical evidence is clearer cut. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2010) find a robust positive 
association between competition and decentralization. A similar positive correlation was reported in 
AALVZ and Marin and Verdier (2008). All of these are cross sectional studies. Guadalupe and Wulf 
(2009) use the Rajan and Wulf (2006) panel data on the changing organizational structure of firms 
over time. They argue that the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989 constitutes an 
exogenous increase in competition for US firms in the industries where tariffs were removed. 
Exploiting this policy experiment they find that competition is associated with delayering (increasing 
span for CEO) and that this is likely to also reflect increased delegation.  
 
Culture 
In recent years, economists have started to take cultural factors more seriously in determining 
economic outcomes (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006; Grief, 1994). Part of this is due to the 
influence of Putnam (1993) on the importance of social capital and the finding that trust is important in 
a number of economic dimensions (e.g. see Knack and Keefer, 1997, on economic growth or Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2009, on foreign trade).  
 
Trust is an obvious candidate from improving delegation incentives as it will relieve the agency 
problem that the delegated agent will steal from the principal. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) 
observe more delegation in countries where rule of law is strong. However, contracts are never 
perfectly enforceable and this leaves a role for trust to help generate more delegation. And indeed trust 
also appears important – they also find a higher level of trust in the region where a firm is located is 
associated with a significantly greater degree of decentralization. They also exploit the fact that they 
have many subsidiaries of multinational firms so they can construct measures of trust in the country of 
origin (the multinational‟s headquarters) and location (country were affiliate is set up), and find that 
both of these seem to matter for decentralization. Further, using the bilateral trust between countries 
from they find that when trust between pairs of countries is high, decentralization is more likely (even 
after controlling for region of location and country of origin fixed effects). This suggests that trust can 
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affect the structures of global firms and that some aspects of organization are transplanted abroad as 
suggested by recent theories of international trade. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Human Resource Management (HRM) has changed dramatically in last two decades, with Personnel 
Economics now a major field in labor economics. The mark of this work is to use standard economic 
tools applied to the special circumstances of managing labor within companies. In surveying the 
literature we have detected several broads themes:  
 
First, although there have been significant improvements in measuring management in general and 
HRM in particular, we are struck by the scarcity of high quality data. This is especially true in the time 
series dimension where our basic understanding of trends even in the more easily measured 
dimensions of HRM such as incentive pay is remarkably poor. This reflects a general paucity of data 
on the internal structures of firms which needs to be addressed by researchers and statistical agencies.  
 
Second, data concerns notwithstanding, there do appear to be some facts emerging. There is a 
discernible trend towards the incidence of more incentive pay in recent decades (at least in the US and 
the UK). More aggressive use of high powered-incentives on pay, promotions, hiring and firing is 
more prevalent in the US and Northern Europe than Southern Europe and Asia. The data on 
productivity is much better: we have shown wide distributions of productivity within and between 
countries and HRM appears to mirror these patterns. 
 
Third, there is suggestive evidence that certain types of HRM raise productivity. There is certainly a 
robust positive cross sectional association between bundles of “modern” HRM practices and 
productivity, but with some exceptions (e.g. Ichinowski et al, 1997) these are not robust in the time 
series dimension. Studies of single or small groups of firms have been more successful in identifying a 
positive association of changes in HRM policies (in particular individual and group incentive pay) and 
productivity. But hard causal evidence of the type common in program evaluation elsewhere in labor 
economics is rare and a major future research challenge is to generate better designs to test the causal 
relationship. 
 
Fourth, causality issue apart, there is suggestive evidence of widespread complementarities both 
between different types of HRM practices and between HRM and other aspects of firm organization 
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(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Information and Communication Technology appears particular 
important with several pieces of evidence that combining ICT with the right fit of HRM practices 
makes a large difference for productivity. 
 
Fifth, although the “Design” perspective of Personal Economics has led to powerful insights we have 
argued that some types of HRM (and management in general) has technological aspects in the sense 
that there are some practices that, on average, are likely to be the right ones for all firms to adopt. 
Under this view, the productivity dispersion we observe is partially linked to the fact that some firms 
that been slower to adopt these than others. Weak competition and poor governance in family run 
firms are both associated with sub-optimal HRM practices, consistent with this “Managerial 
Technology” perspective.  
 
Finally, we have made substantial theoretical and empirical progress in one aspect of work 
organization - the decentralization of decisions. Technological complexity, ICT, skill supply and social 
capital all seem to foster more decentralization (although causality remains an issue again). It would be 
good to see more efforts to drill down on other forms of work organization. 
 
HRM and productivity is an exciting and lively field and has made great strides in the last two 
decades. We see its future as being integrated in the general research programs of the economics of 
organization and management which are becoming a major part of modern labor economics.  
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Table 2.1 Increases in Incentive pay in large publicly listed US firms 
 
Year of Survey  More than 20% of 
employees have 
Individual incentives 
(e.g. performance 
bonuses) 
More than 20% of 
employees have 
gainsharing (e.g. team 
bonuses) 
More than 20% of 
employees in teams 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1987  38 7 37 
1990  45 11 51 
1993  50 16 65 
1996  57 19 66 
1999  67 24 61 
 
Source: Lawler et al (1995, 2001), Lawler and Mohrman (2003) 
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Table 2.2: Trends in General HRM using British WERS Survey  
 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 P value for 
change 
High involvement practices 
Work organisation 
 Team working 
 Functional flexibility 
 Quality circles 
 Suggestion schemes 
Skill and knowledge acquisition 
 Team briefings 
 Induction training 
 Training in human relations skills 
 Information disclosure about 
  investment plans 
 Information disclosure about financial 
  position 
 Information disclosure about staffing 
  plans 
 Appraisals 
Work enrichment 
 Job variety 
 Method discretion 
 Time control 
Motivational practices 
 Motivation a major selection criterion 
 Internal recruitment 
 Job security guarantees 
 Single status 
 Profit-related pay 
 Share-ownership scheme 
Total quality management 
 Self-inspection 
 Records on faults and complaints 
 Customer surveys 
 Quality targets 
 Training in problem solving 
 Just-in-time production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
31 
 
 
32 
 
56 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
30 
26 
 
42 
 
 
44 
 
56 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
31 
 
 
49 
71 
39 
30 
 
49 
76 
38 
49 
 
60 
 
52 
 
49 
 
40 
21 
20 
 
84 
32 
6 
63 
46 
24 
 
53 
64 
47 
39 
23 
35 
 
 
 
54 
75 
28 
36 
 
70 
90 
52 
46 
 
58 
 
61 
 
67 
 
39 
19 
21 
 
80 
26 
10 
61 
45 
28 
 
44 
62 
53 
55 
23 
32 
 
 
0.11 
0.21 
0.45 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
0.47 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.65 
0.59 
0.77 
 
0.11 
0.04 
0.01 
0.57 
0.31 
0.00 
 
0.01 
0.52 
0.05 
0.00 
0.90 
0.47 
 
Notes: The following variables relate to practices as they pertain to the core non-managerial 
occupation at the workplace; team-working (equals 1 if 80%+ core employees in teams); functional 
flexibility; appraisals (equals 1 if all core employees appraised); work enrichment. Single status is if 
core workers are treated the same as managers in terms of benefits such as pensions 
 
Source: Bryson and Wood (2009) based on UK WIRS/WERS data 
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Table 3.1 Studies of the “effects” of HRM on productivity 
 
Panel A: General HRM Practices 
 
Study Data HRM measures Method Results 
Bartel, Ichinowski and Shaw 
(2007) 
US Valve manufacturing, 
panel data on one plant and 
survey data on 212 plants 
Teams, incentive pay and 
basic and technical training 
Site visits plus a telephone 
survey matched to US 
Census data (the LRD) 
Modern HRM practices 
associated with the adoption 
of new IT technologies 
Black and Lynch (2001) 1993 EQW-NES 
Educational Quality of the 
Workforce National 
employer Survey. An 
establishment level surveys 
of US plants (in all private 
sector with over 20 
employees) matched to 
Census manufacturing data 
1987-1993  
Large variety including self-
managed teams, profit 
sharing, job rotation, unions, 
Total Quality Management 
(TQM), benchmarking, 
communication, meetings, 
training, etc. 
Cross sectional OLS. Using 
Census panel use GMM-
DIF to estimate plant 
productivity and relate this 
to HRM practices  
Profit sharing for non-
managers significantly 
related to productivity 
(stronger in  union firms) 
Black and Lynch (2004) 1993 and 1996 EQW-NES 
matched to Census data. 
72% response rate in 1993 
and 78% in 1996. In 1996 
1,493 in cross section, 284 in 
panel 
See Black and Lynch (2001) OLS in cross section and 
long-differences, regressions 
Profit sharing significantly 
related to productivity in 
cross section, but 
insignificant in changes 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 
(2010) 
1,633 firms in 7 European 
countries. Cross section of 
management data in 2006 
combined with panel of 
firm-level accounting data 
and IT data from Harte-
Hanks 
People management score 
(see section 2)  over careful 
hiring, performance pay, 
merit-based promotion, 
fixing/firing, etc. 
OLS production functions 
with and without fixed 
effects 
Complementarity between 
IT and people management. 
Higher coefficient on IT for 
subsidiaries of US 
multinationals (compared to 
other multinationals) 
accounted for  higher IT 
productivity 
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Cappelli and Neumark (2001) EQW-NES (see Black and 
Lynch, 2004). 
Manufacturing only - match 
in plants from 1977. N=433 
(1993-77); N=666 (1996-
1977)  
Large variety including 
teamwork, profit sharing, 
job rotation, etc. 
Estimate cross sectional 
OLS and 2 long-differenced 
equations: 1993-1977 and 
1996-1977. Assumption is 
that workplace practices all 
zero in 1977 so level in later 
period can be treated as a 
difference 
Almost all variables 
insignificant in cross section 
and panel in productivity 
equations (a few more in 
wage equations). Profit 
sharing*self managed team 
interactions significantly 
positive  
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) UK (re-organization) and 
French (delayering) 
establishment level data.  
3 equations with dependent 
variables as (i) growth of 
skill shares; (ii) 
organizational form 
(delayering in France, 
general organizational 
change in UK); (iii) 
productivity 
OLS cross section and long-
differences 
Evidence for “Skill-biased 
organizational change”. 
Organizational changes 
appear to (i) increase 
demand for more skilled 
workers; (ii) have larger 
positive effect on 
productivity when combined 
with more skilled workers. 
Regions with lower costs of 
skills are more likely to 
introduce organizational 
change. 
Cooke (1994) Manufacturing firms in 
Michigan 
Employee participation and 
group incentives 
OLS Value added increases. 
Wages also increase (but by 
less than value added) 
Cristini et al (2001) 100 Italian manufacturing 
firms 
Adoption of HRM practices 
around job-rotation, team 
work and selective hiring 
and performance pay 
Cross-sectional survey and 
panel performance data 
Find HRM practices 
clustered across firms, and 
associated with improved 
firm level performance 
Easton and Jarrell (1998) Publicly quoted firms TQM Matching techniques Positive effect of TQM on 
financial performance 
Griffith and Neely (2009) Introduction of “Balanced 
Scorecard” in single UK 
retail firm 
Scorecard a mix of several 
factors. Individual and 
group performance taken 
into account 
Look at monthly data for 3 
years before and after the 
roll-out of the program 
No effect at the mean. 
Productivity dispersion rises 
– more able managers 
increase by more. 
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Huselid (1995) Survey of senior HR 
executives (28% response 
rate). 826 large (100+ 
employees) publicly quoted 
US firms in 1991. 
Uses Principal Components 
to get 2 factors analysis 
from 13 questions. (1) 
employee skills and 
organization (8 items); (2) 
employee motivation (3 
items). Sum these. 
OLS regressions with 
dependent variables: sales 
per employee, profitability 
and Tobin‟s q 
One or both variables 
significant in each of 3 
performance equations 
Huselid and Becker (1996) Repeat Huselid (1995) 
survey to get cross section 
and panel data in 1993. 740 
responses (20% rate) and 
218 firms in panel 
As Huselid (1995) OLS and FE regressions 
with dependent variables as 
profitability and Tobin‟s q 
Sum is significant in cross 
section, but insignificant in 
panel dimension  
Ichinowski (1990) 65 business units in 
manufacturing. 7% response 
rate 
 OLS Clusters of practices 
(including enriched job 
design) associated with 
better financial performance 
Ichinowski, Prennushi  and 
Shaw (1997) 
Integrated steel mills. Steel 
finishing lines. Monthly 
productivity is downtime 
due to defects rates. 36 mills 
and 17 companies over 5 
years. Essentially this is 
team which operates 
finishing line. 
Introduction on an HRM 
system on 7 dimensions – 
incentive pay; careful hiring; 
teams; training; information 
sharing; broad job design 
and job security. 
OLS regressions with fixed 
effects. 
Large increases in 
productivity from adopting 
innovative HRM system 
(scores highly on all 
dimensions). Adopting one 
or two practices do not help. 
Find practices tend to be 
clustered suggesting 
complementarities. 
MacDuffie (1995) A 1989-1990 survey of 
human resource practices in 
62 automotive assembly 
plants.  
  Finds bundles of practices 
clustered across plants, and 
that this bundles  
Osterman (2006) National Establishment 
Survey (NES). Uses panel of 
around 800 US private 
sector establishments (see 
Black and Lynch, 2004) 
High-performance 
workplace organization, 
defined as employee 
involvement in self-
managing teams, job-
rotation and quality circles 
OLS Increased wages from 
adoption of high-
performance workplace 
organization, appears due to 
increase productivity 
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Panel B: Individual Incentive Pay 
 
Study Data Incentive Method Result 
Bandeira, Barankay and Rasul 
(2005) 
Workers on a UK soft fruit 
picking farm. Daily field 
productivity data of workers, 
and the peer groups they 
interact with. 
Piece-rate pay (bonus for 
amount of fruit picked) and 
relative performance pay 
(bonus for amount of fruit 
picked relative to rest of the 
picking group). 
Mid-season change in bonus 
system from relative pay to 
piece-rate pay 
Relative bonus led to lower 
picking rates, particularly if 
the rest of the comparison 
group were friends, 
especially if they could 
mutually monitor 
performance. Suggests 
workers internalize impact of 
their performance on their 
colleagues. 
Bandeira, Barankay and Rasul 
(2007) 
Managers on UK soft fruit 
picking farm. Daily field 
productivity data on workers 
under manager. 
Performance bonus to 
manager depending on 
average worker (fruit picker) 
productivity in the day. 
Previously flat hourly wage 
Mid-season change in 
payment system by 
company (designed by 
researchers) in 2003. 
Include manager and field 
fixed effects. 
Pickers‟ productivity 
increases by 21% (at least 
half is selection). Variance 
of productivity (and 
earnings) increases because 
managers target their effort 
towards more able workers. 
Selection effect arises 
because managers drop the 
less able workers from their 
teams. 
Bandeira, Barankay and Rasul 
(2009a) 
As in Bandeira, et al (2007). 
Also use 3 measures of 
social connectedness: same 
nationality; live in close 
proximity to each other on 
farm; arrived at similar time 
on farm 
Individual (from flat hourly 
wage) 
Mid-season change in 
payment system by 
company (designed by 
researchers) in 2003 
Under flat pay productivity 
of a worker 9% higher when 
socially connected to 
manger, but under incentive 
pay this difference is zero. 
After incentive pay, 
productivity of highly able 
increases and less able 
decreases. Average 
productivity lower because 
of favoritism. 
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Study Data Incentive Method Result 
Bandeira, Barankay and Rasul 
(2009b)  
As in Bandeira, et al (2007) 
but this time a change in 
2005. Survey of friends. 
Change in the type of team 
incentive – feedback vs. 
tournament 
Fruit pickers are in teams of 
c.5. Engineer a change from 
team piece rates to (i) give 
feedback, then (ii) give 
tournament prize 
Both interventions increase 
sorting: high ability want to 
work with each other). 
Productivity increases by 
24% with tournament (string 
incentive effect) but 
decreases by 14% with 
feedback (because sorting 
reduces social ties). Note 
cannot look at causal effect 
of group vs. individual pay  
Fernie and Metcalf (1999) 413 British jockeys (184 in 
balanced panel) 
Some employed on fixed 
retainers and others offered 
prizes for winning races. 
Different prizes across 
races. 
(i) Random effects 
controlling for bookie's 
estimates of horse and race 
likely success.; (ii) control 
for jockey fixed effects for 
small sample where 
incentives reduced due to 
new owner 
Large incentive effects – 
those facing prizes supply 
much more effort. Switching 
to lower powered incentives 
reduces effort. 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) Agricultural workers in 
Philippines. Body weight 
changes for those on 
different types of pay. 
Weight changes a proxy for 
effort 
 Piece rate workers vs. flat 
rate workers 
Conditional on calorie intake 
piece rate workers lose more 
weight. But calories for 
piece rate higher overall due 
to higher wages. 
Freeman and Kleiner (2005) US Shoe manufacturer. 
Monthly data on shoes 
produced (And scheduled 
production) 1991-1994 in 2 
plants 
Switch away from 
individual piece rates to 
hourly pay. Also coincided 
with other changes to 
management – continuous 
production 
OLS regressions with 
dummies for pay regimes. 
Monthly trend and other 
controls 
Workers productivity higher 
under piece rates pay by 6%. 
But profits increased with 
abolition due to lower 
inventory, higher quality, 
and more frequent product 
changes. 
Griffith and Neely (2009) Introduction of “Balanced 
Scorecard” in single UK 
retail firm 
Scorecard a mix of several 
factors. Individual and 
group performance taken 
into account 
Look at monthly data for 3 
years before and after the 
roll-out of the program 
No effect at the mean. 
Productivity dispersion rises 
– more able managers 
increase by more. 
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Study Data Incentive Method Result 
Kahn, Silva and Zilak (2001) Brazilian tax collection 
authority. Productivity 
measured by number of 
inspections and amount of 
fines collected from tax 
evaders 
Individual and group 
incentives introduced in 
1989.  Objective and 
subjective performance. 
Large: bonuses 70% of 
additional fines collected 
Look 3 years before and 
after scheme introduced. 
75% increase in rate of 
growth of fines per 
inspection. Problem that 
extortion may also increase 
Lavy (2009) Israeli teachers. Policy 
introduced in 50 schools in 
December 2000.  
Policy introduced of 
awarding bonuses based on 
pupils pass rates and scores 
in matriculation exams in 
English and math. Rank 
order tournament. Only 
about a third of eligible 
teachers won awards 
(ranged from 6-25% of 
salary) 
Schools treated based on a 
policy rule - threshold based 
on 1999 matriculation 
results with error. Consider 
18 schools in treatment and 
18 in control. 
Significant improvement in 
teacher performance. 
Appears to be through 
changes in teaching methods. 
No evidence of distortions. 
Lazear (2000) Safelite Glass Company 
(windshield installers). 2,755 
workers over 19 month 
period. 29,837 person 
months 
Individual (from flat hourly 
wage to per windshield) 
Change in payment system 
by company. OLS 
regressions with and without 
fixed effects 
44% increase in productivity 
(22% incentive, 22% 
selection from new hires, not 
from leavers) 
Shearer (2004) One firm of tree planters in 
British Columbia (Feb-July).  
9 male workers randomized 
in and out of piece rate and 
hourly rate (so same worker 
observed under both 
systems). Up to 16 days per 
worker. 
Random assignment (design 
doesn‟t allow him to look at 
selection) 
20% increase in productivity 
(22% in structural model) 
 
Panel C: Group Incentive Pay 
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Study Data Incentive Method Result 
Baiker and Jacobson (2007) US Police Departments 1984 Comprehensive Crime 
Control act provided police 
departments opportunity to 
share in proceeds of drug-
related asset seizures 
OLS 10% increase in fraction 
returned to police 
department associated with a 
$0.19 increase in values of 
seizures. Police work 
strategically putting greater 
emphasis on possession 
(high cash component) rather 
than drugs sales. 
Blasi, Freeman, Mackin and 
Kruse (2009) 
Survey of 100+ studies on 
group incentives (“shared 
capitalism”) 
  Average increase in 
productivity by 4.5% 
Boning, Ichinowski and Shaw 
(2007) 
One product line in US steel 
mini mills (bars from 
recycled steel). 36 mills (20 
firms) over 5 years  
Proportion of mills with 
problem solving teams rises 
by 10% to 50% 
OLS regressions with fixed 
effects 
Productivity rises 6% with 
teams and effect strongest 
when products are complex; 
incentive pay also associated 
with higher productivity 
Burgess, Propper, Ratto, 
Scholder and Tominey (2007) 
UK HM Customs and Excise 
(tax collection department) 
April-Dec 2002. Weekly 
data. Look at yield and time 
(mainly on “trader audit”)  
Office managers given 
incentive on team bonus. 2 
treatment teams (N=154 in 3 
offices bonus equal across 
all workers), another N= 158 
in 6 offices bonus varied 
according to grade). One 
blind control (N=281) 
OLS Difference in 
Differences 
Team productivity increased. 
Main effect through 
selection where most 
efficient workers were 
allocated to the more 
incentivized task.  
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 
(2003) 
US unionized garment 
manufacturer (Koret in 
Napa), 1995-1997. Weekly 
production data on sewing 
function for women‟s skirts, 
pants, etc. 288 employees 
(20,627 person-weeks) 
Change from individual 
piece rate to teams with 
group based incentives pay. 
Production from Taylorist to 
“modular” in response to 
demands for more flexible 
batches from retailers 
Workers have some 
discretion over when they 
switch. 
OLS with person effects and 
time effects. Dummy for 
team membership. Puzzle of 
more able switching first 
(some lost income) and 
having the same exit rate as 
least able. Assumes due to 
non-pecuniary benefits of 
team work. 
No evidence of free-riding. 
On average productivity rose 
18%.  Increased use of 
collaborative skills. Gains 
greater for more 
heterogeneous teams. More 
productive workers switched 
earlier, so 4% is selection, 
14% effect on same workers.  
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Study Data Incentive Method Result 
Jones and Kato (1995) 109 large unionized 
manufacturing firms in 
Japan 1973-1980 
ESOPs (presence) and 
Bonuses (amount of bonus 
per worker) 
OLS estimation of 
production functions with 
fixed effects. No IV for 
incentive pay introduction 
Introduction of ESOP 
increases productivity 4-5%, 
takes 3-4 years of this effect. 
A 10% increase in bonus per 
employee leads to a 1% 
increase in productivity the 
following year. 
Knez and Simester (2001) Continental Airlines 
Personnel data. Productivity 
measured by on-time 
departure rate. 648 airports 
over 22 months 
Continental airlines in 1995. 
Promised $65 monthly 
bonus to all employees if 
firm-wide goals met. Used 
outsourced airports 
(Continental‟s operations 
managed by outside workers 
who were not covered by 
scheme) as a control group. 
Regress change in on-time 
departures on full 
outsourced and partially 
outsourced. Control for 
lagged performance.  
Significant increase in 
productivity. Mutual 
monitoring in team based 
production. 
Lavy (2002) Israeli teachers. February 
1995 competition announced 
for monetary bonus to 
secondary school teachers.  
Compares introduction of 
group bonuses (based on 
pupil performance) with 
more schools resources. 
Awards tied to average 
student credit, matriculation 
diplomas and dropout rates. 
62 schools eligible, one third 
won. $1.5m disbursed, about 
75% went to teacher pay 
(Bonuses only 1-3% of 
average salary). 
Compared results in 
treatment and control group 
by 1997. 
Significant improvement in 
teacher performance. 
Incentive pay more cost 
effective than general 
increase in resources. 
Stronger effects for weaker 
students 
Mas and Moretti (2008) Supermarket checkout 
clerks; all supermarket 
transactions in 6 stores 
 Within a 10 minute work 
interval, personal 
productivity rises by 1.7% 
when working in front of a 
peer who is 10% more 
productive than average. 
High productivity clerks 
increase the productivity of 
low productivity clerks, but 
only if the high productivity 
clerk can observe the low 
productivity clerk. 
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Panel D Distortions associated with incentive pay schemes 
 
Asch (1990) US Navy Recruiters Individual (Recruiters paid 
& measured) based on 
enlisted sailors 
Non-linear incentives If Navy recruiters near their 
targets they worked harder, 
especially nearer the end of 
the year. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) Mutual fund managers At end of year managers 
have an incentive to change 
level of risk 
 Distortion present for many 
years 
Coutry and Marschke (2004) Managers of Federal job 
training centres (JTPA). 16 
agencies 
Group (budget of training 
office) and nonlinear. 
Bonuses augment operating 
budget of agencies by 7% on 
average 
Choice of termination date 
(up to 90 days after end of 
training) 
Managers act to increase 
payouts near end of each 
measurement period. Quality 
of overall training fell. 
Strategic behavior lowers 
program graduates wages 
and therefore welfare 
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer 
(2003) 
Kenyan schools (50 schools 
in treatment group).  
2 year program offering 
school wide bonuses to 
teachers. Awards given if 
schools improved test scores 
and reduced dropout rates 
Randomized control trial  Test scores improved 
significantly for treatment 
group the 2 years when the 
program ran. But after 
finished no lasting gain. No 
improvement in drop-out 
rates. Teacher attendance 
and methods did not change. 
Teachers put on extra exam 
preparation classes to “cram” 
for tests.  
Larkin (2007) Salespeople in a Software 
Firm   
Bonuses given when sales 
people hit their targets. 
Distortions induced from 
salespeople substituting 
sales across periods, and 
giving discounts if they are 
going to just miss their 
targets  
 Costs firm 6-8% in potential 
revenue 
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Oyer (1998) Executives and salespeople 
in General study of firms 
with different fiscal end 
years 
  Effort high at end of fiscal 
year and low at beginning 
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Table 3.2 Performance and people management practices 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Ln(Sales/ 
employee) 
Ln(Sales/ 
employee) 
Ln(Sales/ 
employee) 
Profitability 
(ROCE) 
Sales growth Survival 
       
People Management  
 
0.299 
(0.028) 
0.178 
(0.021) 
0.142 
(0.024) 
1.417 
(0.701) 
0.041 
(0.013) 
0.49a 
(0.26a) 
Ln(Capital/ 
Employee) 
  
0.115 
(0.014)    
%College Degree   
0.078 
(0.014) 
   
       
Country & industry 
dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 3,380 3,380 3,380 2,369 2,298 3,627 
Observations 29,390 29,390 29,390 20,141 19,568 3,627 
 
Note: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates clustered by firm, except for column (7) which is estimated by Probit 
(we report marginal effects at the sample mean). Survival is defined as firms who are still in operation in Spring 2009 (including if they have been taken over by another firm). 
Sample of all firms with available accounts data at some point between 2000 and 2008. Management score has a mean of 2.973 and a standard-deviation of 0.664. “Country 
and industry dummies” includes a full set of 17 country and 162 SIC 3-digit dummies. “General controls” comprise of firm-level controls for ln(average hours worked) and 
ln(firm age). “Noise controls” are 78 interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time 
of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. All regressions include 
a full set of time dummies. “People Management” is the firm-level people management score covering pay, promotion, hiring, firing, retaining employees, consequence 
management and human capital targets. “% College Degree” is the share of employees with a college degree (collected from the survey). “Profitability” is ROCE which is 
“Return on Capital Employed” and “Sales growth” is the 5-year growth of sales. Survival is equal to zero if a firm exited due to bankruptcy/liquidation by the end of 2008 
and one otherwise.a marginal effect and standard error multiplied by 100. The sample mean of non-survival is 2.1% so the marginal effect of -0.49 implies one management 
point is associated with 23.5% (=0.49/2.1) lower exit rate. 
Source: Authors‟ calculations using Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) data 
Figure 2.1 Incidence of Performance Pay, US men in PSID, 1976-1998
Source: Lemieux, McLeod and Parent (2009)
Notes: Male heads of household earning between $1 and $100 per hour. Self employed and public sector excluded. 30,424
observations on 3,181 workers. Performance pay in current year=1 if any part of compensation includes bonus, commission
or piece rate. Stock options and shares are not included. A performance pay job is one where the worker ever receives some
performance pay over the life of the job-match.
Figure 2.2 Trends in performance Pay 1984-2004, UK
Source: Pendleton, Whitfield and Bryson (2009).
Notes: This data is derived from the UK Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) in 1984, 1990 and 2004. This is
a representative sample of all UK establishments with over 25 employees. Although there were other WERS in 1980 and
1998 the questions are not consistent. The consistent question relates to the incidence of any form of contingent pay for
workers (Individual, Collective – such as team bonuses, Profit-related pay or Employee Share Ownership Schemes). The
incidence of contingent pay grew from 41% to 56% by 1990, but fell to 55% in 2004. The data relates to whether there was
any incidence of this type of pay – we do not know how many workers were covered or what proportion of their remuneration
was contingent.
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Figure 2.3 HR management practices across countries
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Notes: Averages taken across a random sample of the population of medium sized (100 to 5000 employee) manufacturing 
firms within each country. 5,850 observations in total. Firms per country in the right column. Scores firms on seven practices 
around pay, promotions, retention and hiring, where high scores. Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
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Figure 2.4 Promotions, fixing/firing, and rewards practices by country
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Note: Averages taken across a random sample of medium (100 to 5000 employee) manufacturing firms within each country. 
5,850 observations in total. Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
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Figure 2.5 Firm level distribution of HR management by country
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Figure 4.1 Labor market regulation and HR management practices
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Figure 5.1 Ownership and HR management
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Figure 5.2 Multinationals take good HR management practices abroad
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Figure 5.3 Decentralization of firm decision making by country
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marketing from the corporate head-quarters. Low (negative) scores means plant managers have little autonomy and mainly follow 
instructions from their corporate head-quarters. Averages taken across a random sample of medium (100 to 5000 employee) 
manufacturing firms within each country. 5,850 observations in total. Source: Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009a). 
Figure 5.4 Factors associated with decentralization
5.4A Industry heterogeneity 5.4B Proximity to technological frontier
Notes: Decentralization defined in terms of percentage of firms 
5.4C Firm age
that are profit centers (rather than cost centers). Data from 3570 
firms in French COI national survey. 
Source: Acemoglu, Aghion, Le Large, Van Reenen and Zilibotti 
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